2011/06/22

润之哥哥要开会(开慧)──评{建党伟业}

        作为一个有轻度自虐倾向,经常通过看低智和低俗的烂片来维持我在智商和品味上优越感的人,首先需要承认的一点是,我正是怀着这种看恶片的猥琐心理把{建党伟业}找来看的。

不得不说,我其实是有些轻度失望,作为一部舔菊片,该片对史事的尊重是令人意外的,刺陶成章,暗杀宋教仁,五四青年暴徒,红帮代表小会这些细节都没把某党横空出世之前都描绘得暗无天日,也没把某党建立过程描绘的光辉万丈。在一刹那,我甚至都觉得还称呼这片子是舔菊片是有点不够准确的,严谨地说,在我看过的伟光正片子里面,这部是吐点和笑点都很高的。了解我的人都知道,其实这是个很高的评价。
    先说片名,这点我要批评韩三爷,这片名挺没文化的,让一帮别有不良用心的人可以钻空子,最近我已经看过很多个拿片名做文章的段子:奸党痿业,贱裆痿业等等。其实片名完全可以比这个取得文艺一些嘛,比如{一个图书管理员和他的朋友们}{13罗汉开会记}{润之,仲甫,守常早年那些事},如果要走小清新路线,也可以叫{润之哥哥要开会(开慧)}{从文文到东东的故事}
再说情节,清末天朝乱世,黑帮造反此起彼伏,最大的黑帮有2个,一个文文做头领的国民党,在南方势力比较大,一个是凯凯做头领的北洋系在北方势力比较大,还霸占着帝都,此外全国各地还有一些更小的黑帮,就不一一道明了。2大黑帮长期争斗,名义上北洋系的凯凯做大总统,但是并无控制全国的实力,文文经常被架空,但是江湖fans最多,经常被文文忽悠起来给凯凯捣乱。影片就刻画了一个姓蔡的公子哥,本来是凯凯的手下,其实他心里最fan的是文文,可以说他是文文的骨灰级fans,把如花似玉的凤姐放一边,帮助文文起兵造凯凯的反去了。在他和凤姐分别的那一刻,我仿佛看到华仔扮演的蔡哥哥在那一刻犹如尔康附体,说出了全片最具重口味的台词:
奈何,七尺之躯,已许国,再难许卿
令人失望的是,这样吐点和乐点交加的段子,全片并不多。

在这个黑帮逐鹿,暗无天日的大背景下,几个乱世中打酱油的小青年出现鸟。他们分别是在帝都的海归青年仲甫和守常,以及湖南文艺青年润之哥哥。讽刺的是,后来的历史表明海归仲甫和守常只是打酱油的,润之哥哥才是真正打江山的。片中有个耐人寻味的情节,润之哥哥和一帮人相约去法国学习当时国际开始流行的红帮造反经验,上船之前,润之突然改变主意,放弃了成为一个海归的机会,他语重心长的对要走的朋友说:外国的经验搬到中国来能行吗?中国的问题太复杂了,我还是留下来吧。
我依稀记得我出国的时候,国内的哥们也语重心长的对我说过类似的话,出国要想清楚,占一个坑比啥都重要,不要到你回来的时候,坑都被别人占了。后来的历史证明了润之的高瞻远瞩,是土鳖润之而不是留学的哥哥们成了红帮的建帮大佬,在之后另一个大佬守常被杀,头号大佬仲甫被苏联打压,润之建帮大佬的身份对于他在帮内地位的稳固是有决定性作用的。

        全片对红帮理论着墨不多,只说红帮理论是德意志马老师和恩老师所创,海归仲甫和守常去日本留过学,他们连原版书都没看过,只是看日文翻译的二道贩子罢了。至于土鳖润之和他的那几个会友们,红帮理论更是仲甫和守常传播给他们的,基于大佬仲甫和守常都没出席会议,所以红帮建帮大会叫做红帮思想3道贩子大会更符合事实。另外,红帮当时参与领导的学潮罢工中,那些青年和现在论坛上随处可见的愤青,那些看到法国接见达赖就要去砸家乐福,看见美国卖武器给台湾就要去砸麦当劳的爱国青年们没什么不同。在这里我要表扬韩三爷对历史的忠实,对红帮历史稍有了解你就知道,红帮从来所说的团结广大劳苦大众,所谓劳苦大众大多数时候就是这种头脑发热就喜欢打砸抢的年轻人,这种人有更恰当的洋词来表述就是goons and thugs.

     最后点评下片中出现过的美女,惊鸿一瞥的凤姐 (angelbaby)之惊艳自不必说,国母庆龄之温婉可人让人羡煞文文,看到北大学生妞的制服诱惑让人不禁有穿越的欲望,当然这一切在润之的开慧妹子(李沁)面前,就都黯然失色鸟。TNND, 左棍们拍得片子为神马妞都显得那么纯哩?

2011/05/23

David Gordon论哈佛教授Michael Sandel的“Justice”讲座

很想把这篇文章翻译出来,但是想想太费时间,就算了,如果你看过思考过Sandel的讲座,相信这篇文章能启发你更多的思考。

另:附上“Justice”讲座网址



It is easy to see why Michael Sandel is a popular Harvard professor. He presents major ideas of ethics and political philosophy in a clear way, tied to important contemporary issues. Justice: What's the Right Thing to Do?, based on a famous course that Sandel teaches, offers a discussion of what Sandel regards as the three main competing views of justice.

The first of these takes welfare to be the criterion of justice. What counts as just is what leads to the best consequences. Thus, supporters of the free market such as Milton Friedman praise the market because it leads to prosperity, in contrast with other economic systems.

Why do we care [about prosperity]… The most obvious answer is that we think prosperity makes us better off than we would otherwise be — as individuals and as a society. Prosperity matters, in other words, because it contributes to our welfare. (p. 19)
Another approach, which many libertarians will find familiar, takes freedom and rights to be fundamental to justice. What is essential, according to this way of seeing things, is to give each person what is rightfully due to him, even if following this course does not lead to the best consequences.

The approach to justice that begins with freedom is a capacious school… Leading the laissez-faire camp are free-market libertarians who believe that justice consists in respecting and upholding the voluntary choices made by consenting adults. The fairness camp contains theorists of a more egalitarian bent. (p. 20)
The third view, the one to which Sandel is himself inclined, stresses virtue. What character traits should the government, as well as society as whole, endeavor to inculcate in the population?

The idea of legislating morality is anathema to many citizens of liberal societies, as it risks lapsing into intolerance and coercion. But the notion that a just society affirms certain virtues and conceptions of the good life has inspired political movements and arguments across the ideological spectrum. (p. 20)
This latter approach may be less familiar than the other two, but an example will show what Sandel has in mind. He considers sellers who increase prices in response to a disaster. Are not such people displaying greed, a character trait we do not wish people to have? Sandel knows full well the argument that raising prices in a disaster increases the supply of goods that people need. He quotes a characteristically incisive passage from Thomas Sowell on the point at issue.

Thomas Sowell, a free-market economist, called price gouging an "emotionally powerful but economically meaningless expression that most economists pay no attention to, because it seems too confused to bother with" … Higher prices for ice, bottled water, roof repairs, generators, and motel rooms have the advantage, Sowell argued, of limiting the use of such things by consumers and increasing incentives for suppliers in far-off places to provide the goods and services most needed in the hurricane's aftermath. (p. 4)
Nevertheless, he does not regard this consideration as decisive. Even if raising prices promotes welfare, still, "we" don't want to promote greed, do "we"? Sandel is evidently willing to sacrifice a great deal of welfare to obtain the sort of virtue he wants. As we shall later see, his virtue-oriented position has little to recommend it. I have here merely introduced it briefly.

Sandel does a good job in showing the weakness of the welfare view, although here he goes over standard ground. If we aim to achieve the best consequences, will we not sometimes be required to do morally abhorrent things? Some actions, e.g., torture, are wrong, regardless of consequences.

To this objection there is a familiar rejoinder. What about the terrorist and the ticking atomic bomb? Are we really sure that torture is in all circumstances wrong? Sandel has an excellent response. In the imagined case, the terrorist is guilty of a horrendous moral wrong, planting the nuclear bomb. We can sharpen the case by asking whether it would be wrong to torture someone completely innocent, in order to extract the essential information.

Suppose the only way to induce the terrorist suspect to talk is to torture his young daughter (who has no knowledge of her father's nefarious activities). Would it be morally permissible to do so? (p. 40)
The consequentialist would have to answer, implausibly, that it would not be wrong.

Readers of this journal will naturally be interested in what Sandel has to say about one rights-based approach in particular, libertarianism. One might reasonably fear the worst: Sandel stands among the foremost communitarians and, as his previous work makes evident, he views the free market with disdain.[2]

Sandel here proves unpredictable. He thinks that most of the standard objections to libertarianism fail; even if there is something to these objections, libertarians have plausible responses.

Those who favor the redistribution of income through taxation offer various objections to the libertarian logic. Most of these objections can be answered. (p. 66)
If an opponent claims that the free market leaves too much to luck, libertarians can respond that people are self-owners and have the right to make exchanges as they wish. Further, libertarians are by no means obviously wrong when they compare taxation to forced labor. Nor will it do to respond to this that taxation has been democratically enacted. If taxation is slavery, majority support does not change things.

If democratic consent justifies the taking of property, does it also justify the taking of liberty? May the majority deprive me of freedom of speech and of religion, claiming that, as a democratic citizen, I have already given my consent to whatever it decides? (p. 68)
Surprise has its limits. As readers will have already surmised from Sandel's comments about the market and greed, he has not converted to libertarianism. But if he thinks that the usual objections do not overthrow libertarianism, why does he not join us? He answers by moving to his own preference among the three approaches he distinguishes. The problem with libertarianism involves virtue.

"Sandel stands among the foremost communitarians and, as his previous work makes evident, he views the free market with disdain."
Libertarianism allows people to engage in degrading exchanges. A free market would permit people to sell their kidneys for frivolous reasons, e.g., to satisfy a healthy and wealthy eccentric who collects kidneys. Even worse, it would allow consensual cannibalism. Sandel describes a bizarre case in Germany in which this occurred.

[C]annibalism between consenting adults poses the ultimate test for the libertarian principle of self-ownership and the idea of justice that follows from it. It is an extreme form of assisted suicide…If the libertarian claim is right, banning consensual cannibalism is unjust, a violation of the right to liberty. (p. 74)
Further, libertarianism leads to such horrors as an all-volunteer army. People with proper civic spirit will want to defend their country out of patriotism, rather than for pay. If they are not thus motivated, nevertheless they have a civic responsibility to serve and the draft enforces this obligation. Sandel appears to have forgotten his earlier remarks about taxation and slavery — or is slavery all right as long as civic responsibility mandates it?

Sandel's complaints about degrading exchanges cannot be so readily dismissed as his misguided praise for conscription: nevertheless, the appropriate counter to them is apparent. Libertarianism does not claim to encompass the whole of morality. Quite the contrary, it asks only, when is force or the threat of force permissible? The answer to this question delimits a sphere of rights, but not everything that is within one's rights counts as morally acceptable. People are free to do bad things, in the sense that they cannot be compelled to do what is morally required. Only if they violate rights can force be used against them. The fact, if it is one, that the consensual cannibal does not violate rights leaves us free to recoil from him in disgust.

Sandel is well aware of this response, but he does not accept it. He subsumes it under a more general doctrine, neutrality. In this view, the state must remain neutral between competing moral views. (Of course, many libertarians think that the state should not exist, but we can readily substitute "the protection agencies" for "the state" in the argument.) Thus, even if most people find cannibalism morally abhorrent, the state cannot impose this opinion on those who dissent from it.

Sandel argues that neutrality cannot be sustained. Are there not certain issues that require the state to commit itself, one way or the other? The state cannot be neutral on abortion. Either fetal life merits protection, or it does not: the state cannot say that because people have conflicting moral views on the issue, it must stand aside.

For, if it's true that the developing fetus is morally equivalent to a child, then abortion is morally equivalent to infanticide. And few would maintain that government should let parents decide for themselves whether to kill their children. So the "pro-choice" position in the abortion debate is not really neutral on the underlying moral and theological question… (p. 251)
Sandel makes this point in criticism of a familiar target, John Rawls. Here Sandel has in mind Rawls's famous doctrine of public reason, which limits the considerations that may be invoked in public debate.

Sandel's complaint against neutrality fails. Even if he were correct — in my view he isn't — that the state must take a stand on some issues, it hardly follows that it must do so wherever a moral controversy arises. Abortion inevitably raises issues of rights; Sandel's horror stories of degrading exchanges in a libertarian society do not. He thus leaves intact the libertarian contention that people should be free to act as they wish, so long as they do not violate rights.

Anyone with the slightest libertarian inclinations will shudder at Sandel's own approach to justice. As he sees matters, we must determine the meaning of social institutions such as marriage. "What counts as the purpose of marriage partly depends on what qualities we think marriage should celebrate and affirm" (pp. 259–60). Of course it will be the courts that decide this; such weighty matters cannot be left to individual decision. In this way, e.g., disputes over gay marriage can be settled. Having settled such controversies, we can then be enlisted in programs of civic improvement.

A politics of the common good would take as one of its primary goals the reconstruction of the infrastructure of civic life … it would tax the affluent to rebuild public institutions and services so that rich and poor alike would want to take advantage of them. (p. 267)
We can thus transcend the market economy and the greed that motivates it. Onward and upward!

Notes
[2] See, e.g., his Public Philosophy: Essays on Morality in Politics (Harvard, 2005) and my review in The Mises Review Fall 2005.

2011/05/18

神秘主义,理性与灾难──电影{Mist}观后感

周末看了一部恐怖片{Mist},其实故事很简单,一场神秘的大雾笼罩了大地,大雾来临之时,一个超市的人为了躲避这场大雾,不得不留守在超市等待救援,事情越来越糟,大雾中似乎有神秘的怪兽会残杀冲向大雾中的人类。面对未知的灾难,超市里面的人产生不同的反应并结成不同的团体来应付眼前这场灾难。写到这里,你可能觉得这是类似[哥斯拉]或是[狂蟒之灾]那样的又一部陈词滥调的好莱坞恐怖商业片。但是如果我告诉你片子的导演是曾经导演{肖申克的救赎}的Darabont,剧本本身和{肖申克的救赎}一样也改编自斯蒂芬金的同名小说,你还会这样认为么?

片子的美妙之处在于这个超市就是人类社会的浓缩,整个故事就像是一场社会学实验,一群由单个个体的人类在危机来临之时自愿结盟来应对灾难,这种结盟基于3种思想或者说理念。

有限理性:持这种理念的主要人物就是片子的主人公德拉顿,他基于理性和逻辑来理解眼前发生的一切,但是这种理性和逻辑也对现象世界开放,也就是当现象世界和理性推演不一致的时候,他的理性和逻辑是让位于现象世界的,并基于新的现象,用理性和逻辑做出新的反应。他最早看见怪物,他并没有放弃自己的怀疑精神,他通过多种方式求证,并用证据说服他人接受不符合预设理性和逻辑的新现象──怪物。并组织大家和怪物对抗,同样是基于理性和逻辑──怪物是有生命的,它们也会死。他的理性是一种开放性的理性,在没有危机的时候,这种理性实际上就是一种common sense,所以在片子开始,危机并不严重的时候,赞同他的理念并和他结盟的人占大多数。

无限理性:德拉顿的邻居诺顿是这种理念的代表人物。片中很巧妙的安排一开始德拉顿和诺顿相处还算融洽,诺顿甚至帮忙照看德拉顿的儿子。这暗示在一个没有危机的平静世界里,有限理性和无限理性者都有共同的common sense。他们的分歧出现在德拉顿发现了怪物,并告诉诺顿,诺顿完全不相信,甚至当德拉顿带他去看了怪物的残肢他还是不愿意相信。诺顿的理念建立在对预设的理性和逻辑无条件的相信,这种预设的理性和逻辑完全不对现象世界开放。因为怪物不符合他预设的理性和逻辑,所以他拒绝相信,某这程度上,这是理性的自负。很遗憾,导演并没费太多笔墨在诺顿身上,他的跟随者不多,不久他就不顾德拉顿的劝阻带着他们走向大雾送死了。

神秘主义:从片中一亮相就神叨叨的卡莫迪大家也许不会想到后来她能有这么大的能量,灾难没开始和灾难初期的时候她几乎没有任何跟随者,她嘴里喋喋不休的世界末日论和末日审判论让大家讨厌极了。这表明神秘主义在一个相对稳定的环境下与理性相比是没有多大市场的。更多的怪物来袭和更多的人被怪物所杀渐渐改变了一些人的看法,卡莫迪的跟随者越来越多,这些跟随者和德拉顿以及诺顿的跟随者不同,他们是一群放弃个体理性和思考的乌合之众。这些跟随者的初衷或许只是希望从神秘主义那里得到一种精神层面的安慰,可是放弃个体理性的结果注定了这个团体必然会演进成一个暴力的强制性团体,神秘主义和极权之间的桥梁正在于此──个体对理性和思考的放弃。Jessup是第一个牺牲品,在更多的还拥有理性的人会被杀害之前,一场神秘主义和理性的战争爆发了。有限理性者并不干涉别人的自由,但是面对神秘主义者向暴力的演进,他们不得不阻止,最终卡莫迪被射杀了,德拉顿带着仅存的几个“理性人”逃进了茫茫大雾……

很遗憾的是本片没有太多探讨诺顿所代表的无限理性在危机进一步加深的时候会怎么演进,在我看来,无限理性所代表的思想倾向和共产主义思想是一致的,如哈耶克所批判的那样,这是一种理性的自负,它的演进方向其实和神秘主义是一致的──团体的意志被少部分人或者某个人的意志所绑架,最终倒向极权。

2011/05/10

为什么我不信仰宗教

在海外很多年,朋友里面很多都是基督教徒,也不止一次碰到他们试图对我传福音,最近有朋友在facebook上又劝我信教。

其实我是认真想过关于信仰的问题,我爸妈在美国的时候也觉得教会特别好,希望我能信神。我一直不能说服自己有2大原因。我的前一个理由和毛姆类似,作为英国人,毛姆生下来便是基督徒,而那个时代基督徒几乎是把天主教视为异教的。有一天,他忽然想到,他完全可能生在德国南方,成为一个天主教徒,那样他就要因为并非自己的过错而作为异教徒受惩罚了。这未免太荒谬。这样一想,他从此不信教了。我的想法也类似,基督教可能非常好,但是我没法接受某种关于这个世界确定性的解释,假使我入教了,但是在信仰层面上,我没法保证有一天我的思想不会对另外的解释开放。


另外一个理由是功利层面的,我看到的所有信神的人们,他们和我们不信的人们一样面对种种生命中的苦难,逆境和挣扎,我相信他们有神的带领会很不一样,但是认识神本身也需要付出努力和代价的,所以在我看来信神不是根治苦难的magic bullet,如果苦难逆境本身是认识神需要的代价,那么对于一个不信神的人反正也需要付出代价去面对苦难和逆境,在这点上何以信神有优势。


其实我常常觉得biologically的思考这个世界,我就很平和了,我和一个信神的人其实没什么不同,我们都活着,我们都皈依某种价值观,as far as这种价值观让我们心里comfortable,无论它是叫基督教还是别的什么东西。

最后的最后,我会归于一个最没劲的解释,也许genetically,我就不太接受宗教,这或许是遗传自我妈,她在美国去了半年的教会,回去又一直被我信教的姑妈反复传福音,直到现在她还不愿受洗:)老人家不懂自由主义,也不了解进化生物学,我不太确定她用什么和传福音的人们argue, 但是据此你就说她信仰缺失,随波逐流,迷惘彷徨,老人家是万万不会答应的,相反她是我碰到的最有坚定明确人生观世界观的人之一,whatever她坚信的是什么,我想这都让她的内心觉得comfortable,在我看来,一个教徒心中对神的坚守和我母亲对她自己信念的坚守没什么本质的不同。

2011/05/05

从进化心理学的角度理解“反集体主义”

看了刘荻最近的博文“反对集体主义”,只能说部分赞同她的观点。因为在我看来,从进化心理学的角度来理解集体主义也许更靠谱。
纯粹的个体主义在哺乳动物中几乎是不存在的,因为需要交配来繁衍后代,即使最孤僻的动物也需要性交和性伴侣配合组成暂时或者永久的最小“集体”。从这个意义上来说,所有人类其实都是小集体主义者,现代人类的大脑实际上是进化并适应了丛林时代的“小集体意识脑”。而集体成员的数目应该不超过一个典型的丛林时代部落的数目,在我看来,这比刘荻所说的所谓大脑皮质处理群体活动值150更make sense一些,刘荻没有说明这个数目的文章出处,我怀疑有任何现有神经科学能精确估计人类大脑所能handle的群体活动,而调查一个典型古人类部落的数目则是完全可行的。
人类文明演化出“阶级”“国家”这样的超级部落超过人类的集体意识所能handle的极限,本质上这可能是所有战争,种族灭绝,极权的根源。在现代社会,除非你一个人跑到深山老林,唯名论意义上的个人主义几乎是不可能。Physically, 几乎所有人都不间断的处于集体(公司,单位,学校)或个人(回到家)的状态。纯粹的反对一切形式的集体主义不仅是stupid的,也是不可能的。基于古典自由主义之上的或者安兰德式的自由市场资本主义理念所反对的集体主义也许是不恰当的。既然丛林时代大脑决定了人的本质是小集体主义,那么作为自由主义者,我们需要反对的集体主义其实是大集体主义,比如基于种族,阶级,肤色,收入,人种的集体主义。政治哲学意义上不可分割的单位是个体,但是进化心理学的角度来说,人类最comfortable的存在是小集体,只要这种小集体是基于自愿的联合,并不侵害其他小集体或者个体的利益,这样的小集体就应该被保障。而在现实生活中,也确实如此,在自由民主的社会中,人的存在不是以单个的分离的个体存在的,而是以这样那样的小集体存在的,这些小集体形式,可能是个公司,也可能是个兴趣小组,甚至是因为都得过某种病而自愿联合起来的病友会。


附刘荻文章:

一、集体主义是人类的本能

本文的主旨是反对集体主义,但笔者首先要澄清有关集体主义的一大误解,即认为集体主义是反人性的。

哲学家们通常假设人首先是独立的个人,然后通过契约(霍布斯、洛克、卢梭)或其他方式(诺齐克等)结成社会。这种假 设或许有其意义,但与真实的历史毫不相干。正如哈耶克所说:“霍布斯讲述的原始人的个人主义,纯属无稽之谈。野蛮人并不是孤立的个人,他的本能是集体主义 的,根本就不存在‘一切人反对一切人的战争’。”真实情况是,人类首先是生活在部落中的集体主义者,然后才逐渐发展出了个人主义。人类的本能是集体主义而 非个人主义,小团体中的利他主义、团结、合作和休戚与共都是人类的本性。人类确实会同类相残,但这通常只会发生在部落之间的战争中,很少会发生在一个部落 内部。“一切人反对一切人的战争”恐怕只有在《大逃杀》一类的文艺作品中才能看到。

二、为什么要反对集体主义

既然集体主义是人类的本能,那么我们为什么要反对集体主义呢?这主要是因为集体主义只适合部落大小的小团体,而不适合在更大的世界中采用。

有研究表明,灵长动物(包括我们人类)大脑新皮质的大小与动物所生活的群体的大小成正比。据计算,人类的大脑新皮质 所能处理的群体活动的最大值是150人,这恰恰是原始人类部落的平均大小。因此,一个群体的人数如果在150人之内,群体成员之间可以保持一种紧密团结的 关系,超出了这个数字,成员之间就会变得陌生,群体内部会产生宗派,这时群体就会分裂。这意味着,集体主义的休戚与共最多只能在150人左右的小团体中发 挥作用,超出这个范围,集体主义就失效了。此外,奥尔森等人关于集体行动的研究也表明,群体越大,其成员就越不可能在没有个人激励的情况下为共同的目标而 努力。虽然现代人也会把原本属于部落的集体主义情感投射到民族、国家之类的“大集体”上去,将其作为部落的替代品,但是这种用错了对象的集体主义情感不仅 不能给人类带来可靠的秩序,还可能会给人类带来灾难。

这是因为,人类的集体主义本能中还存在一些在现代文明看来是负面的因素。例如,集体主义总是与排外情绪裹胁在一起, 自己人之间的团结一致总是与对敌人同仇敌忾纠缠不清。这样,集体主义就会阻碍人类超越本能的限制,与“自己人”之外的人建立联系和创造超越部落范围的更大 的秩序和文明。另一方面,集体主义还会压制群体成员的异议,鼓励群体成员的极端化,从而造成“群体思维”、“群体极化”等现象,群体会变得越来越极端,并 且无视自己可能的缺点和错误,也无法集思广益。内部越团结、凝聚力越强、成员之间联系越紧密的团体越容易出现这种现象。集体主义的这两大缺点走向极端,就 会发生电影《浪潮》中所讲述的故事;而如果极端的集体主义感情被引导和转移到如民族、国家或阶级一类的“大集体”上,则会导致法西斯主义和共产主义之类的 极权主义,给人类带来灾难。

三、为什么要提倡个人主义

笔者之所以提倡个人主义,反对集体主义,并不是因为个人主义是人类的本性;笔者提倡个人主义,也不是提倡那种鲁滨逊式的与世隔绝的个人主义。相反,笔者提倡个人主义,是因为只有以个人主义为基础,才能建立起超越部落范围的更大的秩序和文明——即哈耶克所说的扩展秩序。

阅读某些描述非洲和印第安人部落的文字时,笔者的感想之一就是:文明的特征不是民主——原始部落往往也是相当平等和民主的,领导者不仅要尊重多数人的意见,也要考虑少数人的意见——而是个人主义和私有财产。

在没有个人主义和私有财产的情况下,部落只能依据共同的目标和共同的知识采取行动,其结果要么是少数人的意见遭到忽 视和压制,少数人的知识无法得到有效的利用,要么是部落为了照顾少数人,只有在所有人意见一致的情况下才能采取行动,因而无法有效地采取行动。(经济学研 究也证明,除非把企业产权落实到个人头上,使个人能够自由转让企业股份并从中获益,否则集体企业在市场竞争中是没有效率的。)

只有有了个人主义和私有财产,个人才能不顾集体的意见,进行自己的尝试和冒险。说到底,私有财产的目的就是为了划清 每个人之间的界限,保护每个人都有一个自己做主、自己负责的领域不受他人侵犯。只有有了这一私人领域,个人才能利用自己所拥有的财产和的分散的知识(哈耶 克语)进行尝试和冒险,并自己承担后果。说服别人的最好方式并不是语言,而是自己的成功。个人的尝试如果取得成功,就会被他人模仿,从而给整个社会带来好 处,这比在集体讨论会上努力用语言来说服他人采用自己的方法有效得多;而如果他的尝试失败,付出代价的也只有他自己。

只有个人主义和私有财产使得个人能够充分利用自己所拥有的分散的知识,与陌生人的交往和贸易才能大规模进行,与市场 有关的规则和秩序才能超越部落的范围不断扩展,更大规模的劳动分工才能实现,生产率才能不断提高,我们今天这种世界规模的文明和秩序才能成为可能。也就是 因为如此,波普尔才把每个人都面临个人选择的社会叫做开放社会,而把那种个人必须服从于集体的目标的社会叫做封闭社会或极权社会。

四、应该如何对待集体主义?

虽然集体主义有着以上种种缺点,但集体主义是我们本性的一部分,我们不可能、也不需要完全消灭集体主义。我们都需要 在家庭和小团体中获得温暖和归属感;由于在大社会中出人头地是如此不易,我们也需要在小团体或小圈子中享受一把受人尊敬的感觉;当然,我们也会利用集体主 义本能来成就某些事业,努力让集体主义本能与现代文明相适应,为现代文明做出贡献。但是我们也要时刻提醒自己:没有个人主义与私有财产,就没有我们今天的 文明世界。同时我们也要警惕集体主义的负面因素,如排外、种族主义等;还要警惕把集体主义本能引导和转移到民族、国家、阶级等“大集体”上去的政治企图。

2011/05/04

Caplan论精英与自由意志主义

Caplan是{理性选民的神话}作者,乔治梅森大学教授。

There are times and places where most people want more individual freedom than they have. The majority of the citizens of the Soviet Union did not want the state to seize farmers' land, or send Orthodox priests to Siberia. The majority of the citizens of 18th-century France and Spain did not want to pay high taxes to build their kings more palaces and fund more foreign wars. And I bet that the majority of the citizens of modern China want the freedom to have any many kids as they want. In the right times and places, a libertarian can say "give the people what they want" with a good conscience. In the right times and places, a libertarian can be a populist.

In modern democracies, however, libertarian populism is not a viable option. Why? Because there is very strong evidence that the majority favors either as much or more government than exists. (For a summary, see here). All of the main categories of government spending - Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid, military - are popular. The only item the public consistently favors cutting is foreign aid - about 1% of the budget. Furthermore, the public heavily supports even the least defensible infringements on personal liberty - like prohibition of marijuana.

OK, libertarians: Suppose you could press a button that overruled one of the multitude of statist policies that a majority supports. Would you push?

If you won't push the button, you're not much of a libertarian. The libertarian who refuses to overrule popular statism is saying, "Individual freedom will have to wait until the majority thinks it's a good idea." That's more tedious than waiting for Godot.

If you are willing to push the button, however, people will call you an "elitist" for second-guessing the majority. And they'll be right. The libertarian who overrules popular statism is saying "At least on this issue, I know better than most people."

With my recent piece in Cato Unbound, several people have questioned whether my elitism is consistent with libertarianism. They've got it all wrong. In a modern democracy, not only can a libertarian be elitist; a libertarian has to be elitist. To be a libertarian in a modern democracy is to say that nearly 300 million Americans are wrong, and a handful of nay-sayers are right. So how can you be one of the nay-sayers, unless you think you and your fellow nay-sayers have exceptionally good judgment?

None of this means, of course, that libertarians ought to be rude or unfriendly. If we want to change the world in a libertarian direction, we have to convince people who don't already agree with us. And rhetorically speaking, "I'm right, you're wrong" falls flat. (I prefer "I'm right, the people outside this classroom are wrong, and you don't want to be like them, do you?") But in a modern democracy, libertarians cannot honestly praise the wisdom of the common man. He's the guy who got us where we are today.

2011/04/23

伊斯兰妇女的面纱与消极自由

法国政府最近通过法律禁止佩戴伊斯兰妇女传统的面纱(布卡)。
在我看来,这是一项典型的目的与手段背道而驰的法律,法律目的萨科奇说是保障被压迫妇女的权益得到尊重,而法律的手段却是限制权利。如果按照萨所说的目的,应该制定的法律是禁止他人违背本人意志在任何时候佩戴黑纱。所以,本质上这是民主体制下,少数人自由被大多数人侵害的例子。
有人说这是法国国家价值观所决定的,我怀疑所谓国家价值观的存在,如果有所谓这种价值观存在,这种价值观只会成为它侵害少数人价值观的借口,历史上这样的悲剧实在太多。
多元文化中当然有主流文化,主流文化当然一直在同化非主流的文化,但是这种同化应该是在文化交融中基于自愿基础上达成的,文化的融合和同化类似自由市场,更有生命力,更推动社会进步的文化会渐渐成为主流,比如穆斯林的布卡,全法国经常带布卡上街的妇女也就2000多,所以布卡背后所代表的文化在多元的法国文化中是很小众的文化,有什么理由去干涉只有区区2000人所代表的习俗呢?
还有人认为应该做个调查看多少妇女是基于自愿还是强迫带面纱。其实可以分析这种可能的调查结果,如果多数人是自愿蒙面,新的法律当然侵害他们的消极自由。如果多数人是被迫蒙面,穆斯林女性是受害者,法律事实上是在已有的强制上加上另外一层强制,这样的法律限制的对象事实上是受害者,而非强迫她们蒙面的人,当然不是义法。而事实上任何事实上的强迫在西方现行法律体系里面应该都是非法的,限制蒙面的法律也无制定必要了。
自由的底线是消极自由,无论带黑纱基于任何理由,只要是自愿,法律对此的任何干涉就是破坏人的消极自由。带黑纱的自由和喜欢同性的自由是同一种自由,无论带布卡的妇女,gay,lesbian多么让持主流价值观的人讨厌,他们的自由一样应该得到尊重。基于“为了他们好,解放她们”这样的理由去行使积极自由,实质上是对自由的侵害。一个今天不让带黑纱,明天制定禁止同性恋的国家也许后天就会不让你在家和老婆看A片。作为来自不让和老婆在家看A片国度的诸君,还不应该警醒么?

论费交的快要倒掉

美国交响乐团赫赫有名的“五大”之一,费城交响乐团最近申请了破产保护,很多人在哀叹这次经济危机对文化产业或者比较依赖慈善捐款的产业影响之大,经济危机当然是重要原因,但除此之外,general地说,我也并不看好整个古典音乐这个行业。
总觉得某个行当,还主要抱着1百年,2百年前的作品反刍来反刍去的,是注定没前途的,当然你可以argue所谓经典就是耐人玩味来玩味去的,不过架不住一票人前仆后继玩味百年。创造这些作品的人的creativity当然是顶尖的,但是就后人来说,演绎这些作品需要的creativity必然等而下之。如果某个行当注定入行者做的再牛逼也比祖师爷逊,多半这行当不值得看好。同样的观点也适用于红学,国学之类的行当。

2011/03/24

我的推论1

最近博客更新越来越少,主要是但凡有所思,随手就在twitter上更新了。上推2年多,我的总推数也上千了。推特140个字很有讲究,这个长度就英文来说,总觉得表达很有限,可是中文已经能完整叙述一个观点并加上1,2个简单的例子,每天在案边工作的人,思想的小火花,偶然的顿悟都随时可以记上。我转推很少,基本上都是原创推,今天下载那个twitter备份软件,决定编个“我的推论”系列,放在blog上凑数吧。

2009-11-06 01:03:23
h3k4wu: 我们向全世界输出玩具、电脑、服装、美食,更应该输出伟大的GFW和书报审查制度

2009-11-03 05:30:29
h3k4wu: 我觉得到初中都还没自己想办法把做爱生小孩这些事情弄明白的童鞋们多少显得求知欲不够旺盛

2010-01-05 14:47:45
h3k4wu: Avatar告诉我们:人权,平等之所以是普世价值,不是说它是仅适用于英帝/美帝/地球人的价值,而是适用于任何有情感智慧生物的价值.

2010-01-06 02:31:02
h3k4wu: 昨天友人生日,一起吃饭后寿星提议要请大家去脱衣舞厅,被我严词拒绝,理由如下:long holidays之后导致看脱衣舞的边际效用严重递减

2010-01-06 21:27:02
h3k4wu: 恩,这个情节将对AV编剧很有启发......评:新版《水浒》孙二娘造型惹眼 擀面杖做兵器(组图)

2010-01-08 16:27:50
h3k4wu: 扩展下老鼠的话:不可以颠覆的政府不是好政府,不可以反对的领袖不是好领袖,不可以质疑的权威不是好权威,不能让我打旺其他MM的GF不是好GF

2010-01-13 14:27:25
h3k4wu: 以前是让人家不停自宫,现在好了,google说,大爷我不宫了,俺现在出宫,不侍候马戈壁的皇上了......

2010-01-17 03:39:35
h3k4wu: 我们是最幸运的算术平均数......就像我们所谓的:从零到无限大,从呆小病患者到莎士比亚进行积分化,一统化...----扎米亚京城{我们}

2010-01-17 03:42:34
h3k4wu: 凡属于野蛮世界的东西,早已被赶到绿色大墙外面,它们都不美。只有理性的、有益的东西才是美的,例如机器、靴子、公式、食物等等----扎米亚京{我们}

2010-01-18 06:43:26
h3k4wu: I came, I saw,I tweet

2011/02/12

一个并不积极的结论

有一天LP写作文写到关于价值观的题材,问我什么是价值。

我不大记得当时我是怎么回答的,不过我想我的回答我并不满意。

对人类而应,所谓价值必然是和生命相关的,一滴水,变成汽漂在空中,或是流躺在臭阴沟; 一颗石头,被暴徒当作凶器打人,或是被研磨成饰物被美女挂在胸前,对这滴水,这个石头而言,都不存在价值,因为它们没有生命,一直在那,并不曾改变。如果人永远不死,像石头那样,我怀疑大多数时候我们眼里的价值还有什么意义,如果知道可以永远在一起,爱情有什么价值(好笑的是情侣们永远喜欢说永远在一起,如果他们知道永远能在一起还会那么说么); 如果知道永远没法消灭对方,仇恨有什么价值; ......如果知道永远不死,生命还有什么价值。

所以,价值的前提是生命的有限性,因为生命的有限性,让个体可能面对或者选择的每一种体验变得有限,从而有了价值。

个体的选择和体验是如此不同,所以人类发展出形形色色如此不同的价值观,从有人类历史开始,不同的价值观的人们生活在一起,不同的价值观碰撞,影响,冲突,人类也就彼此影响或者冲突。不过这林林总总的价值观里面,和人类生存密切相关的是关于信仰的价值观,在此基础上产生了各种各样的宗教; 另外是关于探索的价值观,在此基础上人类通过理性和逻辑建立了科学和人文。价值观总是关于个体感受的,所以对于A很有效用的价值对于B可能就是一堆狗屎,所以我既鄙视有些信仰者沾沾自喜的认为自己是上帝的选民而我等非信仰者必进地狱无疑,也鄙视另一些人举着科学和理性的大旗认为所有宗教神秘主义者都是傻逼(其实我在所这句话的时候表明宽容对我是一种很有效用的价值)。

更深入的思考是人类何以会有价值观,有句我经常喜欢说的名言是:又当婊子,又立牌坊。在我看来这真实的刻画了人类生存的2个维度:做婊子是生存或者谋生,立牌坊是皈依某种价值观。从进化心理学的角度,谋生并繁衍后代是生物个体保存和发展的根本,而价值观可以认为是生物进化的副产品,人类现在的情形是副产品其实深刻的影响了人类谋生和生存的能力。基于理性和科学的价值观,人类生产出种种产品延长了人类存在的寿命和谋生能力,在理性和逻辑基础上,人类又发展出种种管理和社会组织形式,比如民主,这些让人类谋生和丛林时代相比变得更有效率。

而我的疑惑是,为什么基于理性逻辑基础上的价值观没有被这个世界大多数人接受,在我看来,理性和逻辑本身的价值就如此吸引人,如果价值有2个维度来define,那就是求真和求美,在这个2个维度上,基于理性和逻辑基础上的科学,个人自由和权利既真而且美。在这个信息和交流如此发达的时代,无论如何我实在无法相信难道有人终其一生都没有遭遇那“美”与“真”并为之倾倒的时刻?

为什么这个世界很多女人还理所当然的认为妇女就应该在陌生男人面前蒙着面纱,和其他女人分享同一个老公也是理所当然?为什么很多人理所当然认为离开一个强大的组织或者群体自己无法生存?为什么有人天然的觉得把自己的命运交给一个神秘力量或是一个社会中更强大的组织或者个人是理所当然的?为什么有人相信生病了求个签画个符会有用?为什么有那么多读到硕士博士的MM们还如此醉心于星座属相占卜等神秘主义把戏?

回答这一切让我又转向进化心理学寻找答案,轻信,盲从,神秘主义的价值观或许就是进化的一部分,这些价值观的本质在我看来就是某种形式思维的偷懒,任何时候理性逻辑都需要独立思考,而选择轻信,盲从,神秘主义意味着停止质疑,把更多的精力与能量用在“做婊子”上,无疑,在生产力很低的丛林时代,轻信盲从神秘主义的价值观或许比理性和逻辑更有生存优势,进入现代,科学,个人自由和权利已经显示出强大力量并积极影响人类生存的时代,已经内化成我们大脑一部分的轻信,盲从,神秘主义的残余并没有消失。也许宗教,对权力和权威的轻信盲从只不过是人脑的功能呢?宾大神经科学Newberg博士写了一本书Why God Won't Go Away: Brain Science and the Biology of Belief,他发现人们进行宗教活动比如祈祷的时候,大脑某个区域会发生变化。

也许这种想法有点邪恶,但是很吸引我,那就是对于大多数人来说,轻信,盲从和相信神秘主义是constitutively我们大脑功能的一部分。这让我觉得人类试图改变他人的很多努力都是浮云,我不相信迷信,宗教会在这个世界消失,我不相信一个尊重个人权利和自由理念会在这个世界流行,我不相信巫医巫师骗子会在这个世界失业。

诺贝尔经济学奖得主阿玛蒂亚.森写过一篇著名文章:民主作为一种普世价值?我想问森博士的是,既然如此,何以民主制度没有在全世界建立given民主产生已经有超过千年历史。在伦理学,经济学的层面理解人类行为之上,更本质的也许是生物学的理解人类行为。

2011/02/08

老庄是哈耶克和米塞斯的鼻祖──道家思想的奥派解读

读老庄,有所悟:

奥派的鼻祖其实是一个中国人,他的名字叫做老子,请看老子的名言:我无为,而民自化; 我好静,而民自正; 我无事,而民自富; 我无欲,而民自朴

老子说:天地相合,以降甘露,民莫之而自均 /这句话让哈耶克来表达就是自发秩序

老子说:道常无为而无不为 /这句话让奥派学者来表达是:一个最少干预的政府能把把国家治理到最好

庄子说:圣人不死,大盗不止 /这句话用奥派观点来表达就是,不消灭“万能的”central planning,国家就没法治理好

老子说:天网恢恢,疏而不失 /这句话让奥派来表达就是:市场就像一张无形的大网,尽管看起来并不严密,但是却能达到最有效的调节生产和分配

老子说:天之道,利而不害; 圣人之道,为而不争 /这句话让奥派来表达就是:真正的道德是基于利益基础上的,不为了别人牺牲自己的利益,也不危害别人的利益成就自己; 而那些所谓“圣人”的道德,确是鼓吹“为民”而不争功,这实际上意味着一种可以在任何情况下牺牲个人利益的道德

老子说:其政闷闷,其民淳淳;其政察察,其民缺缺 /奥派解读这句话是:一个最少干预的政府治下,人民安居乐业,而无所不管严刑峻法的大政府治下,民众反而彼此欺骗道德沦落

老子说:不言之教,无为之益,天下希及之 /奥派解读这句话是:靠理论的灌输是得不到自由的思想的,更少的管制才意味着更多的自由,而这种自由,在今天的世界已经越来越少了

难怪有人说道家哲学是最具有现代色彩的,儒而不是道成为中国历代政治家所信奉的正统思想实在是杯具。

2011/02/01

作为自由主义者的萧十一郎李寻欢们───重读古龙

最近饭前厕间翻闲书,翻完了古龙的{萧十一郎},金庸,古龙,梁羽生3大家中,古龙我相对读得少一些,以前总觉得他的小说过于程式化,所以读得并不多。
如今看{萧十一郎}却有一些新的感悟。
在我看来,大多数古龙笔下的人物,如萧十一郎,李寻欢等他们不隶属于任何帮派或者组织,他们的行事也并不服从于任何大的江湖恩怨所支配的运动,他们的所有 的道德是个人主义的而不是某种民粹主义或国家主义的,从这个意义上来说,萧十一郎,李寻欢们是真正的自由主义者。看萧十一郎的时候,我常常有一种尼采笔下 那种接近超人的形象,天地中孤独的一个人,独立寻找和实践存在的意义和价值,他们的道德则是安兰德式的,他们不愿意牺牲自己利益成全某个抽象的“集体”, 也不愿意牺牲别人的利益来成全自己。
“暮春三月,羊欢草长;天寒地冻,问谁饲狼?人心怜羊,狼心独怆;天心难测,世情如霜。”这完全就是一个自由主义者在人世间孤独的追索存在意义的写照。
与古龙笔下人物作为对照,另一个武侠大师金庸笔下的人物则完全不是这样的,金庸笔下的“英雄”们从来就不是自由主义的(英雄从来就不可能是自由主义的,英 雄身上体现的是大众的价值观),他们总是以这样或者那样的方式从属于某个门派(丐帮的郭靖,萧峰,华山派的令狐,武当张无忌….),或者某项运动(武林正 派与明教,武林正派与契丹,武林正派与侵宋元军),他们所信奉的是一种民粹主义或者国家主义的理念,这种理念的体现就是所谓的“侠之大者”。郭靖的全部价 值观就是“为民”,慕容复是个悲剧的国家主义者,{笑傲江湖},{倚天屠龙记}里面的名门宗师们无一不是个人价值的否定者,他们无一不认为离开那个无所不 在的利维坦──江湖,个体的价值并不存在,正如他们所说:“有人的地方就有江湖,你又能逃到哪里去?”这多么像国家主义政治哲学鼻祖霍布斯说的“人所有的 一切价值,一切精神的实在,只能经由国家而有之。”武林宗师们对那种试图独立于武林利维坦的个体都无一例外的采取绞杀的措施,他们的全部作为就是不断的增 强那个硕大无比的利维坦──江湖而凌驾于每一个个体之上。金庸笔下最自由的人物也许算令狐冲,他身上的个人主义是不见容于“华山派”和“武林正派”这个无 处逃脱的集体和体制中的,他所有痛苦和矛盾的根源就在于他作为个体的选择在无处不在的利维坦──江湖中是不太可能的,遗憾的是,金庸本人是一个没有能力也 不愿意理解自由主义的作家(现实中的他毫无疑问是个国家主义者),体现在令狐冲身上,即使是他这么一个最接近自由主义者的人物也是一个不纯粹的自由主义 者,这体现在,金庸让令狐冲做了那个绞杀他个人价值的利维坦──江湖的领袖,比这更滑稽的是让他爱上了任盈盈这么一个缺乏自由精神的黑帮头领,所以{笑傲 江湖}的结局是一个有自由主义精神的人却选择背离了自由主义,这是令狐的选择,其实更是金庸的选择,无论是在书上,还是在现实。

2011/01/23

罗克维尔演讲:米塞斯的梦想

这是奥派大佬Mises institute的Chairman Lew Rockwell在2010初发表的演讲。

翻译:MarkGreene

I'm finding it ever more difficult to describe to people the kind of world that the Mises Institute would like to see, with the type of political order that Mises and the entire classical-liberal tradition believed would be most beneficial for mankind.
我发现如今向人们描述米塞斯研究院所愿意看到的那种世界的样子正变得越来越困难了,而米塞斯以及整个古典自由传统都相信那种类型的政治秩序将成为全人类的最大福祉。
It would appear that the more liberty we lose, the less people are able to imagine how liberty might work. It's a fascinating thing to behold.
仿佛我们失去的自由越多,就越少有人能够想象自由会如何造福于社会。这是一个非常让人感兴趣的现象。
People can no longer imagine a world in which we could be secure without massive invasions of our privacy at every step, and even being strip searched before boarding airplanes, even though private institutions manage much greater security without any invasions of human rights.
人们已经不再能够想象一个我们可以安全地生活而没有在所有层面大规模侵犯我们隐私的世界了,即使在登机前我们都要被脱光衣服搜身,即使私人机构提供了更高的安全性而不会对个人的权利有丝毫的侵犯。
People can no longer remember how a true free market in medical care would work, even though all the problems of the current system were created by government interventions in the first place.
人们已经不再能够记得一个真正的自由市场是如何在医疗领域里运作的,即使当今制度下的所有问题都缘于政府最初的干预。
People imagine that we need 700 military bases around the world and endless wars in the Middle East, for "security", even though safe Switzerland doesn't.

人们想象着我们需要遍布全世界的七百个军事基地和在中东地区进行永无尽头的战争,都是为了“安全”,即使安全的瑞典从来不需要这些。
People think it is insane to think of life without central banks, even though these are modern inventions that have destroyed currency after currency.
人们认为一个没有中央银行的国家是疯狂的想法,即使中央银行制度是现代的发明,即使它已经摧毁了一个又一个的货币。
Even meddlesome agencies like the Consumer Products Safety Commission or the Federal Trade Commission strike people as absolutely essential, even though it is not they who catch the thieves and frauds, but private institutions.
甚至连多管闲事的政府机构像消费品安全委员会(CPSC)或联邦贸易委员会(FTC)在大多数人眼里也是绝对必要的,即使逮住小偷和骗子的并不是它们,而是那些私人机构。
The idea of privatizing roads or water supplies seems outlandish, even though we have a long history of both.
私有化道路和供水的想法现在听起来很古怪,即使关于两者我们都有着一个相当悠久的历史。
People even wonder how anyone would be educated in the absence of public schools, as if markets themselves didn't create in America the world's most literate society in the 18th and 19th centuries.
人们甚至奇怪若没有公共学校孩子们该怎样受到教育,就仿佛自由市场本身没有在18世纪和19世纪的美国造就出全世界最光辉灿烂的文化社会一样。
This list could go on and on. But the problem is that the capacity to imagine freedom — the very source of life for civilization and humanity itself — is being eroded in our society and culture.The less freedom we have, the less people are able to imagine what freedom feels like, and therefore the less they are willing to fight for its restoration.
这张单子还可以开得很长很长。但是问题在于想象自由的能力——文明和人类自身的生命之光——正在我们的社会和文化中渐渐暗淡。我们拥有的自由越少,就越少有人能够想象自由的模样,也因此就越少有人愿意为重建自由而奋斗。
This has profoundly affected the political culture. We've lived through regime after regime, at least since the 1930s, in which the word "freedom" has been a rhetorical principle only, as each new regime has taken away ever more of our freedom.
这也深刻影响了政治文化。至少自1930年代以来,我们经历了一个又一个的朝代,单词“自由”已经仅仅成为了一个修辞手段,即使每一个新朝代都夺走甚至更多的自由。
Now we have a president who doesn't even bother to pay lip service to the idea of freedom. In fact, I don't think the idea has occurred to Obama at all. If the idea of freedom has occurred to him, he must have rejected it as dangerous, or unfair, or unequal, or irresponsible, or something along those lines.
今天我们有了一位甚至连在口头上应承自由理念都嫌麻烦的总统。实际上,我一点都不认为奥巴马的思想里有自由的概念。就算他脑海里曾闪过自由的念头,他也一定会否定它,把它视为危险、不公正、不平等、不负责任,或某种类似的概念。
To him, and to many Americans, the goal of governments is to be an extension of the personal values of those in charge. Isaw a speech in which Obama was making a pitch for national service — the ghastly idea that government should steal 2 years of every young person's life for slave labor and to inculcate loyalty to the leviathan — with no concerns about setting back a young person's career and personal life.
对于他,以及对许多美国人来说,政府的目标是那些手握权力的个人所持有的个人价值观的延伸。我有次见过奥巴马为宣传兵役制度作的演讲——那种恐怖的想法认 为政府应当窃取每个年轻人两年的生命时光来奴役并且反复灌输对利维坦的忠诚——毫不顾虑这会拖累一个年轻人的职业和个人生涯的后腿。
How did Obama justify his support of this idea? He said that when he was a young man, he learned important values from his period of community service. It helped form him and shape him. It helped him understand the troubles of others and think outside his own narrow experiences.
奥巴马是如何为支持这个理念辩护的呢?他说当他还是一个年轻人的时候,他从自己在社区服务的那段时间里学到了重要的价值观。这有助于他的成长和塑造他的人格。这帮助他理解其他人的困扰和跳出他狭隘的个人经验框架去思考问题。
Well, I'm happy for him. But he chose that path voluntarily. It is a gigantic leap to go from personal experience to forcing a vicious national plan on the entire country. His presumption here is really taken from the playbook of the totalitarian state: the father-leader will guide his children-citizens in the paths of righteousness, so that they all will become god like the leader himself.
哦,我为他感到高兴。但是他是自愿选择了那条道路。从个人的亲身经历到把一个邪恶的全民计划强加到整个国家身上是一个巨大的飞越。他在这里的推定的的确确取自极权政府的剧本:君父将引导他的子民走义路,如此他们全都会像领袖自己那样成为神。
To me, this comment illustrates one of two things. It could show that Obama is a potential dictator in the mold of Stalin, Hitler, and Mao, for the presumptions he puts on exhibit here are just as frightening as any imagined by the world's worst tyrants. Or, more plausibly, it may be an illustration of Hannah Arendt's view that totalitarianism is merely an application of the principle of the "banality of evil."
对我来说,奥巴马的陈词有两个解释,它要么表明奥巴马是一个潜在的独裁者,就像斯大林、希特勒、还有毛泽东那样,因为他在这里表露的推断就和任何人类历史 上可以想象得到的最邪恶的暴君一样令人害怕。或者,更好的解释,它也许仅是汉娜·阿伦特思想的一个实证,即极权主义仅仅是“平庸的恶”原则的一种表现。
With this phrase, Arendt meant to draw attention to how people misunderstand the origin and nature of evil regimes. Evil regimes are not always the products of fanatics, paranoids, and sociopaths, though, of course, power breeds fanaticism, paranoia, and sociopathology. Instead, the total state can be built by ordinary people who accept a wrong premise concerning the role of the state in society.
用这个词组,阿伦特意在把我们的注意力引向人们是如何误解了邪恶统治的起源和本质。邪恶统治并不总是狂热者、偏执狂,还有反社会疯子的产物;诚然,权力滋生狂热、偏执与反社会思想。反而,这整个政权却能够由那些在政府的作用方面接受了错误前提的普通人所建立。
If the role of the state is to ferret out evil thoughts and bad ideas, it must necessarily become totalitarian. If the goal of the state is that all citizens must come to hold the same values as the great leader, whether economic, moral, or cultural, the state must necessarily become totalitarian. If the leaders believe that scarce resources must be channeled in a direction that producers and consumers would not choose on their own, the result must necessarily be central planning.
如果政府的作用是惩恶扬善,那它就一定会变成一个极权主义政府。如果政府的目标是所有公民必须持有和伟大领袖相同的价值观,不论是经济上、道德上,还是文 化上,那这个政府就一定会变成一个极权主义政府。如果人民被教导着去相信分配稀缺资源最好的方式并不是由生产者和消费者任凭自己的意愿来选择,那结局就一 定会是中央规划。
On the face of it, many people today do not necessarily reject these premises. No longer is the idea of a state-planned society seen as frightening. What scares people more today is the prospect of a society without a plan, which is to say a society of freedom. But here is the key difference between authority in everyday life — such as that exercised by a parent or a teacher or a pastor or a boss — and the power of the state: the state's edicts are always and everywhere enforced at the point of a gun.
乍看之下,今天许多人不会再坚决拒绝这些前提了。一个由政府来统筹规划的国家已经不再被视为令人恐惧了。今天让人们害怕的却是一个没有中央规划的 国家的前景,也就是说,一个自由的国家。但是我们日常生活中的威权——比如由一位父母或一位教师或一位牧师或一位老板行使的权力——和政府的极权之间有着 本质的不同:政府的法令总是在枪口之下强制实行的,不论何时还是何地。
It is interesting how little we think about that reality — one virtually never hears that truth stated so plainly in a college classroom, for example — but it is the core reality. Everything done by the state is ultimately done by means of aggression, which is to say violence or the threat of violence against the innocent. The total state is really nothing but the continued extension of these statist means throughout every nook and cranny of economic and social life. Thus does the paranoia, megalomania, and fanaticism of the rulers become deadly dangerous to every single person.
有趣的是我们几乎从不面对那个现实——比如你实际上绝不会在大学课堂里听到上述真相被如此平直的表述出来——但这就是核心现实。政府所做的每一件事情本质 上都是侵略行径,也就是说对无辜的人施以暴力或以暴力相威胁。整个政府实际上一无是处,除了连续不断将这些中央集权手段渗透进经济和社会生活的每一个角 落。于是乎,统治者的偏执、自大和狂热得以变得对所有人都是一种致命的危险。
It begins in a seemingly small error, a banality. But, with the state, what begins in banality ends in bloodshed.
它始于一个看上去很微小的错误,一种平庸。但是,一旦到了政府的层面,始于平庸的错误却总是以流血结束。
Let me give another example of the banality of evil. Several decades ago, some crackpots had the idea that mankind's use of fossil fuels had a warming effect on the weather. Environmentalists were prettyfired up by the notion. So were many politicians. Economists were largely tongue-tied because they had long ago conceded that there are some public goods that the market can't handle; surely the weather is one of those.
让我举出另一个“平庸的恶”的例子吧。几十年以前,一些奇怪的人冒出了这个想法,认为人类使用化石燃料对气候有一种暖化效应。环境主义者立即被这个概念煽 动了起来。同样的还有许多政客。经济学家们则大都失语,因为他们很久以前就承认了有一些公共利益是自由市场所无法处理的,当然气候就是其中之一。
Enough years go by, and what do you have? Politicians from all over the world — every last one of them a huckster of *symbolality*, only pretending to represent his nation — gathering in a posh resort in Europe to tax the world and plan its weather down to precise temperatures half a century from now.
经过了足够多的岁月,你们得到了什么?来自世界各地的政客们——他们中每一个家伙都是某种类型的政治贩子,仅仅假装着代表他的国家——在欧洲一个豪华的度假胜地汇集一堂,妄图对全世界征税并计划从今天开始的半个世纪之内让气温下降到某个精确的温度。
In the entire history of mankind, there has not been a more preposterous spectacle than this.
在整个人类的历史上,再也没有比这个更加荒唐的奇观了。
I don't know if it is tragedy or farce that the meeting on global warming came to an end with the politicians racing home to deal with snowstorms and record cold temperatures.
我不知道这是否是一场悲剧,一场讨论全球变暖的大会却以政客们匆匆回国处理暴风雪和破纪录的寒冷天气而收场。
I draw attention to this absurdity to make a more general point. What seems to have escaped the current generation is the notion that was once called freedom.
我把大家的注意力集中到这件荒唐的事情上来是为了说明一个更普遍的观点。对当今一代来说,似乎他们所遗忘的是曾经被称之为自由的概念。
Let me be clear on what I mean by freedom. I mean a social or political condition in which people exercise their own choices concerning what they do with their lives and property. People are permitted to trade and exchange goods and services without impediment or violent interference. They can associate or not associate with anyone of their own choosing. They can arrange their own lives and businesses. They can build, move, innovate, save, invest, and consume on terms that they themselves decide and define.
让我澄清一下我说的自由指的是什么。我指的是一个社会或政治环境,在这个环境之下,人们对自己的生命和财产行使自己的选择权。人们被允许没有妨碍不受暴力 干涉地交易和交换产品和服务。他们能够任意与自己选择的人结合或分开。他们能够安排自己的生活和事业。他们能够开发、移动、创造、储蓄,以及投资在任何他 们自己定义的事物上。
What will be the results? We cannot predict them, any more than I can know when everyone in this room will wake up tomorrow morning, or what you will have for breakfast. Human choice works that way. There are as many patterns of human choice as there are humans who make choices.
结果会怎样?我无法预言,就像我无从知道这个房间里的在座各位明天早上醒来之后,你们早饭会吃什么一样。人类的选择就是以这种方式来进行。有多少进行选择的人,就会有多少种选择的模式。
The only real question we should ask is whether the results will be orderly — that is consistent with peace and prosperity — or chaotic, and there by at war with human flourishing. The great burden born by the classical liberal tradition, stretching from medieval times to our own, is to make believable the otherwise improbable claim that liberty is the mother, not the daughter, of orderliness.
我们唯一真正应该问的问题就是结果有序与否——安定与繁荣——或混乱,也随之戕害人类的昌盛。古典自由主义传统肩负的重任,从中世纪一直延伸到我们现代,就是让人们相信这个看似不可能的断言,即自由是秩序之母而非秩序之女。
To be sure, that generation of Americans that seceded from British rule in the late-18th century took the imperative of liberty as a given. They had benefitted from centuries of intellectual work by true liberals who had demonstrated that government does nothing for society but divide and loot people in big and small ways. They had come to believe that the best way to rule a society is not to rule it at all, or, possibly, rule it with the people's consent in only the most minimal way,
无可非议的,在十八世纪晚期脱离英国统治而独立的那一代美国人把必要之自由视为天赐。他们受益于数世纪以来由真正的自由主义者所进行的思想工作, 前人们证明了政府对国家没有任何好处,只会用大大小小的方式把人们相互隔开和掠夺人们的劳动果实。他们趋于相信治理一个国家的最好方法就是根本不要去治 理,或者若有可能,则在人民的认可之下,以最有限的方式治理。
Today, this social order sounds like chaos,not anything we dare try, lest we be overrun with terrorists and drug fiends,amidst massive social, economic, and cultural collapse. To me this is very interesting. It is the cultural condition that comes about in the absence of experience with freedom. More precisely, it comes about when people have no notion of the relationship between cause and effect in human affairs.
今天,这样的社会秩序听起来就和混乱没什么两样,不是任何我们胆敢尝试的事情,唯恐恐怖分子和毒品恶魔就会在我们的国家里泛滥成灾,造成社会、经 济,和文化的大面积崩溃。对我来说这种现象很有趣。这是一种在对自由的体验缺位的情况下产生的文化环境。更准确的说,当人们不再有人类活动自有其因果关系 的概念时,才产生了这种文化。
One might think that it would be enough for most people to log on to the World Wide Web, browse any major social-networking site or search engine, and gain direct experience with the results of human freedom. No government agency created Facebook,no government agency managesits day-to-day operation. It is the same with Google. Nor did a bureaucratic agency invent the miracle of the iPhone, or the utopian Cornucopia of products available at the Wal-Mart down the street.
对大部分人来说,只须登录互联网,浏览任何大型社交网站或使用搜索引擎,就足以最直接地体验到人类自由的结晶了。不是政府部门创立了脸谱,不是政 府部门在负责它的日常运作。同样的还有谷歌。也不是官僚机构发明了神奇的苹果手机,或者街角的沃尔玛这样能得到各种各样产品的乌托邦式聚宝盆。
Meanwhile, look at what the state gives us:the Department of Motor Vehicles; the post office; spying on our emails and phone calls; full-body scans at the airport; restrictions on water use; the court system; wars; taxes; inflation; business regulations; public schools;Social Security; the CIA; and another ten thousand failed programs and bureaucracies, the reputations of which are no good no matter who you talk to.
与此同时,看看政府带给了我们什么:车辆管理局、邮局、监视电子邮件和电话、机场的全身扫描、限制用水、法庭系统、战争、税收、通货膨胀、商业监管、公共学校、社会保障、中央情报局,以及其他数不尽的失败计划和官僚机构,不管你和谁说起,政府的声誉总是好不到哪里去。
Now, one might say, Oh sure, the freemarket gives us the dessert, but the government gives us the vegetables to keep us healthy. That view does not account for the horrific reality that more than 100 million people were slaughtered by the state in the 20th century alone, not counting its wars.
现在,你或许会说,哦肯定的,自由市场给了我们荒漠,而政府给了我们蔬菜让我们保持健康。那个观点没有考虑到这个可怕的现实,单单在二十世纪这一个世纪之内,就有超过一亿人被政府所屠杀,而这还不包括政府之间战争的死亡人数。
This is only the most visible cost. As Frédéric Bastiat emphasized, the enormity of the costs of the state can only be discovered in considering its unseen costs: the inventions not brought to market, the businesses not opened, the people whose lives were cut short so that they could not enjoy their full potential, the wealth not used for productive purposes but rather taxed away, the capital accumulation through savings not undertaken because the currency was destroyed and the interest rate held near zero, among an infinitely expandable list of unknowns.
这仅仅是最看得到的损失。正如弗雷德里克·巴斯夏所强调的,唯有考虑看不到的损失,才能发现人类为政府所付出的沉重代价:发明没有被市场化,生意 没有开张,人们的生命被缩短以至于无法充分发挥潜能;财富没有被用于有生产力的目的而被征用到它处;通过储蓄积聚资本无法实现因为货币被摧毁而利率被维持 在近乎于零,这张看不到的列表可以无限制拉长下去。
To understand these costs requires intellectual sophistication. To understand the more basic and immediate point,that markets work and the state does not, needs less sophistication but still requires some degree of understanding of cause and effect. If we lack this understanding, we go through life accepting whatever exists as a given. If there is wealth, there is wealth, and there is nothing else to know. If there is poverty, there is poverty, and we can know no more about it.
为了理解这些代价,需要一定的思想深度。而为了理解更基本和直接的观点,即市场有用政府无用,则并不需要很深邃的思想,不过仍然需要对因果关系有 一定程度的认识。如果我们缺少这种认识,我们就会抱着存在即合理的态度而浑浑噩噩的过活。富人就是富人,没有什么其他道理;穷人就是穷人,也没有太多的理 由。
It was to address this deep ignorance that the discipline of economics was born in Spain and Italy — the homes of the first industrial revolutions — in the 14th and 15th centuries, and came to the heights of scientific exposition in the 16th century, to be expanded and elaborated upon in the 18th century in England and Germany, and in France in the 19th century, and finally to achieving its fullest presentation in Austria and America in the late-19th and 20th centuries.
正是为了化解这种深深的无知才在西班牙和意大利诞生了经济学学科——工业革命最初的起源地——在十四和十五世纪,在十六世纪达到了科学解释的高度,在十八世纪的英国和德国被扩大和细化,以及十九世纪的法国,而最终在十九世纪晚期和二十世纪的奥地利和美国臻于完善。
And what did economics contribute to human sciences? What was the value that it added? It demonstrated the orderliness of the material world through a careful look at the operation of the price systemand the forces that work to organize the production and distribution of scarce goods.
经济学对人类科学的贡献是什么?它提供了什么价值?它通过仔细审视物价系统的运作、组织生产的动力、稀缺商品的分配来揭示我们这个物质世界的秩序。
The main lesson of economics was taught again and again for centuries: government cannot improve on the results of human action achieved through voluntary trade and association. This was its contribution. This was its argument. This was its warning to every would-be social planner: your dreams of domination must be curbed.
数世纪以来,经济学的这主要一课被反复教导给人们:政府无法改善通过自发的交易和结合而实现的人类活动的结果。这就是它的贡献。这就是它的结论。这就是它对每一个想为国家做规划的人给出的警告:你的统治梦想一定是受到约束的。
In effect, this was a message of freedom,one that inspired revolution after revolution, each of which stemming from the conviction that humankind would be better off in the absence of rule than in its tyrannical presence. But consider what had to come before the real revolutions: there had to be this intellectual work that prepared the field of battle, the epic struggle that lasted centuries and continues to this day,between the nation-state and the market economy.
实际上,这是一个自由信息,激励了一次又一次的革命,每一次的革命都源自这个信念:没有暴君的统治,人们的生活会好上许多。但是想想在真正的革命 到来之前一定会有的革命先声,一定会有为战场做好准备的思想工作,这场极权政府和自由市场之间可歌可泣的斗争持续了数世纪之久,一直延续到了今天。
Make no mistake: it is this battle's outcome that is the most serious determinant in the establishment and preservation of freedom. The political order in which we live is but an extension of the capacities of our collective cultural imagination. Once we stop imagining freedom, it can vanish, and people won't even recognize that it is gone. Once it is gone, people can't imagine that they can or should get it back.
毫无疑问:正是这场斗争的结果才是对谁能当权和自由能否保存起到最决定性的因素。我们所处的政治秩序不过是我们共同的文化想象的延伸。一旦我们不再想象自由的模样,自由就会湮灭,而人们甚至不会意识到它的消失。一旦自由消失,人们就无从想象他们能够而且应该把它夺回了。
I'm reminded of the experience of an economist associated with the Mises Institute who was invited to Kazakhstan after the fall of the Soviet Union. He was to advise them on a transition to free markets. He talked to important officials about privatization and stock markets and monetary reform. He suggested no regulations on business start-ups. The officials were fascinated. They had become convinced of the general case for free enterprise. Because they understood that under socialism officials were poor.
我回忆起了一位和米塞斯研究院有联系的经济学家的经历,他在苏联解体后应邀去了哈萨克斯坦。他们邀请他为向自由市场过渡出谋划策。他向那些官员谈 起私有化和证券市场和货币改革。他建议不要对创办企业进行任何监管限制。这些官员对此极感兴趣。他们对自由企业这个一般概念有着坚定的信念。他们明白社会 主义意味着官僚们也同样贫穷。
And yet, an objection was raised. If people are permitted to open businesses and factories anywhere, and we close state-run factories, how can the state properly plan where people live? After all, people might be tempted to move to places where there are good-paying jobs and away from places where there are no jobs.
可随后,却冒出了一个反对意见。如果允许人们在任何地方办厂办企业,而且我们也关闭了国营企业,那政府又该怎样适当的规划人们在哪里安居呢?毕竟,人们会被诱惑迁移至有好工作的地方,远离没有工作可干的地方。
The economist listened to this point,kept warning of the objections.He nodded his head that this is precisely what people will do. After some time,the government officials became more explicit. They said that they could not simply step aside and let people move any where they want to move. This would mean losing track of the population. It could cause overpopulation in someareas and desolation in others. If the state went along with this idea of free movement, it might as well shut down completely, for it would effectively be relinquishing any and all control over people.
这位经济学家听取了这个想法。他摇了摇头,说这就是人们会做的事情。过了一会,政府官员们变得更直接了。他们说他们不会在一边袖手旁观让人们自由迁移到他 们想去的地方。这将意味着失去对人口数量的控制。它会导致某些地区人口的过度膨胀而另一些地区的人口荒芜。如果政府任由这个自由迁移的想法实施,那政府也 会彻底垮台,因为政府实际上放弃了对人民的全部控制力。
And so, in the end, the officials rejected the idea. The entire economic reform movement foundered on the fear of letting people move — a freedom that most everyone in the United States takes for granted,and which hardly ever gives rise to objection.
于是,在最后,官员们拒绝了这个想法。整个经济改革运动于是就建立在了害怕人民自由迁移的基础上——在美国几乎所有人都视之为理所当然的自由,几乎从没人会提出异议。
Now, we might laugh about this, but consider the problem from the point of view of the state. The whole reason people stay in office is to control. You are there to manage society. What they really and truly fear is that by relinquishing control of people's movement, they were effectively turning over the whole of society to that they described as the wiles of the mob. All order may be lost. All security gone. People would make terrible mistakes with their lives. They would blame the government for failing to control them. And then what happens? The regime loses power.
现在,我们也许会对这件事情感到很可笑,但是从政府的角度来考虑这个问题就不一样了。你坐在办公室里的唯一理由就是控制。你当官就是为了管理国 家。你实际上和真正恐惧的就是当松开对人口迁移的控制后,会把整个国家交到一群诡计多端的暴徒手中。所有秩序都会失去,所有的安全保障都将不复存在。人们 会对他们的生活做出糟糕的选择。他们会指责政府没能履行约束他们的责任。然后会发生什么呢?政权就会失去它的力量。
In the end, this is what it always comes down to for the state: the preservation of its own power. Everything it does,it does to secure its power and to forestall the diminution of its power. I submit to you that everything else you hear, in the end, is a cover for that fundamental motive.
归根结底,这就是对政权来说最为关键的地方:保存它自己的权力。政府做的每一件事情,都是为了保卫它的权力,都是为了防止权力的缩小。我向你们保证所有你们听到的其他东西,到最后,都是为了掩盖那个最基本的动机。
And yet, this power requires the cooperation of public culture. The rationales for power must convince the citizens. This is why the state must be alert to the status of public opinion.This is also why the state must always encourage fear among the population about what life would be like in the absence of the state.
然而,权力需要公众文化的合作。为权力辩护的理论基础一定要让公民信服才行。这就是为什么政府一定会对舆论保持警觉。这也是为什么政府一定总会激发群众的恐惧心理,让人们害怕一个政府缺位的社会。
The political philosopher who did more than anyone else to make this possible was not Marx nor Keynes nor Strauss nor Rousseau. It was the 17th-century philosopher Thomas Hobbes, who laid out a compelling vision of the nightmare of life in the absence of the state. He described such life as "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short."The natural society, he wrote, was a society of conflict and strife, a place in which no one is safe.
有一位政治哲学家让这成为了可能,他的贡献比任何人都要大,他不是马克思,不是凯恩斯,不是施特劳斯,也不是罗素,而是十七世纪的哲学家托马斯· 霍布斯,他编排了一个令人信服的,政府缺位的社会中噩梦式的前景。他把这样的生活描述为“孤独、贫穷、肮脏、野蛮和生命短暂”。自然社会,他写到,是一个 充满冲突和纷争的社会,一个没有任何人会安全的社会。
He was writing during the English Civil War, and his message seemed believable. But, of course, the conflicts in his time were not the result of natural society, but rather of the control of leviathan itself. So his theory of causation was skewed by circumstance, a kin to watching a shipwreck and concluding that the natural and universal state of man is drowning.
他的创作时期正值英国内战,而他传达的信息似乎是可信的。但是,当然他所处时代的冲突并不是自然社会的结果,而更接近于控制利维坦本身的结果。所以他的因果理论受限于时代环境,类似于看到一起海难就下结论说人类的自然和普遍的状态就是淹死。
And yet today, Hobbesianism is the common element of both left and right. To be sure, the fears are different, stemming from different sets of political values. The Left warns us that if we don't have leviathan, our front yards will be flooded from rising oceans, big business moguls will rob us blind, the poor will starve, the masses will be ignorant, and everything we buy will blow up and kill us. The Right warns that in the absence of leviathan, society will collapse in access pools of immorality lorded over by swarthy terrorists preaching a heretical religion.
然而在今天,霍布斯主义是无论左右两派的共同元素。毫无疑问,两派的恐惧各不相同,缘于不同的政治价值观基础。左派警告说如果我们不建立一个利维 坦,我们的前院就会被升高的海平面所淹没,商业大佬就会肆无忌惮的抢劫我们,穷人会饿死,大众会因得不到教育而无知,我们买的每一件电器都会爆炸和害死我 们。而右派则警告说如果不建立一个利维坦,皮肤黝黑信奉异端邪教的恐怖分子们就会作威作福,把国家搞得乌烟瘴气,导致国家的崩溃。
The goal of both the Left and Right is that we make our political choices based on these fears. It doesn't matter so much which package of fear you choose; what matters is that you support a state that purports to keep your nightmare from becoming a reality.
左右两派的共同目标就是让我们的政治选择建立在这些恐惧上。而你选择哪一边的恐惧其实无关紧要;重要的是你会支持一个自称能阻止你的梦魇成为现实的政府。
Is there an alternative to fear? Here is where matters become a bit more difficult. We must begin again to imagine that freedom itself could work. In order to do this, we must learn economics. We must come to understand history better. We must study the sciences of human action to relearn what Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Paine, John Locke, Frédéric Bastiat, Ludwig von Mises,Murray N.Rothbard, and Hazlitt, F.A. Hayek the entire liberal tradition understood.
除了恐惧之外还有其他选择吗?这里情况就变得稍微有些复杂了。我们必须再次想象自由本身是如何运作的。而为了能够想象自由,我们就必须学习经济 学。我们必须要更好的理解历史。我们必须要学习有关人类行为的科学以重新掌握约翰·洛克、托马斯·杰弗逊、托马斯·潘恩、弗雷德里克·巴斯夏、路德维希· 冯·米塞斯、穆瑞·罗斯巴德,亨利·赫兹利特、冯·哈耶克以及全部的自由主义传统所理解的知识。
What they knew is the great secret of the ages: society contains within itself the capacity for self-management, and there is nothing that government can do to improve on the results of the voluntary association, exchange, creativity, and choices of every member of the human family.
他们所知晓的是历代的不传之秘:社会本身就拥有着自我管理的能力,在改善自愿的结合、交换、创新,还有每一个人类家族每一个成员选择的结果方面,政府是无能为力的。
If you know this lesson, if you believe this lesson, you are part of the great liberal tradition. You are also a threat to the regime, not only the one we live under currently, but every regime all over the world, in every time and every place. In fact, the greatest guarantor of liberty is an entire population that is a relentless and daily threat to the regime precisely because they embrace the dream of liberty.
如果你明白这一课,如果你相信这一课,那恭喜你,你是伟大的自由主义传统的一分子了。你也同时对政府就是一种威胁了,不仅仅是我们当前生活下的政府,而是 全世界所有时间和所有地方的所有政府。实际上,自由最伟大的保卫者就是一个群众整体,每一天每一日永不放弃地威胁着政权的统治,仅仅因为人们拥抱自由的梦 想。
The best and only place to start is with yourself. This is the only person that you can really control in the end. And by believing in freedom yourself, you might have made the biggest contribution to civilization you could possibly make. After that, never miss an opportunity to tell the truth. Sometimes, thinking the unthinkable, saying the unsayable, teaching the unteachable, is what makes the difference between bondage and sweet liberty.
最好的和唯一起步的地方就是从你自己做起。因为归根到底,唯有你自己是你真正能够控制的那个人。而对自由有着坚定信念的你,也许就能尽自己的力量对人类的 文明做出最大的贡献。之后,不要错过任何一个说出真相的机会。想不可想象之事,说不能说之话,教不可教之知识,有时候,这或许就会导致是奴役还是自由的区 别。
The title of this talk is "the Misesian vision." This was the vision of Ludwig von Mises and Murray N.Rothbard. It is the vision of the Mises Institute. It is the vision of every dissident intellectual who dared to stand up to despotism, in every age.
本次演讲的题目是“米塞斯的梦想”,这是路德维希·冯·米塞斯和穆瑞·罗斯巴德的梦想,这是米塞斯研究院的梦想,这也是世世代代敢于反抗专制独裁的每一位持不同政见的知识分子的梦想。
I challenge you to enter into this struggle of history, and make sure that your days on this earth count for something truly important. It is this struggle that defines our contribution to this world. Freedom is the greatest gift that you can give yourself and give all of humanity.
我要求你们加入这场伟大的历史之战,务必使自己没有虚度在尘世的岁月,正是这场斗争界定了我们对这个世界的贡献。自由就是你们能够为自己还有为全人类带来的一份最伟大的礼物。

2011/01/14

他是Naive还是无耻?──评薛兆丰的{火车票低价造成了举国浪费}

新锐的号称自由主义的经济学家薛兆丰这几年一直在鼓吹火车票提价是解决中国春运问题的最好办法。道理说得是任何有点经济学常识的人都耳熟能详的老调:现有价格不能反映春运期间对火车票的需求,价格升高才能消除短缺。
http://xuezhaofeng.com/blog/?p=991

不知道薛兆丰是真傻还是装傻:
他的说法是建立在春运市场是个充分竞争市场的前提上,那么作为这个市场主体之一的铁路部门,他们自己是自己利益的最好看护者,他们或许不会愚蠢到稀缺应该提价的道理,即使他们那样愚蠢,那也是他们自己的事,干你薛兆丰了事,或者原来薛大学者是为我国铁道官员殚精竭虑阿?
而事实是什么?中国跌路部分是个被国家包养,每年国家给以大量补贴的利益群体,这是哪门子的市场主体,薛大学者讲自由市场,讲价格规律,为什么不讲先取消国家对铁道部门补贴,让民营资本进入铁道市场和铁道部门竞争,让铁道部门成为市场主体再说。现有情形下提价,让铁道部门一边从纳税人那里大把拿钱,又享受“伪自由市场”下垄断老大的定价权,天下哪有这门子好事。
这就好比原来的大学食堂,有大学的补贴,当然他们就没有资格享有随意的定价权,因为大学餐饮提供压根就不是一个充分竞争的自由市场。在一个不是充分竞争的自由市场还没形成之前,让某一方独得自由市场可能得到所有好处,这种貌似学术公允的论调其实不是naïve就是无耻。
薛大学者何妨再继续推广他的涨价万能论,天朝百姓需要排队求爹爹告奶奶才能得到服务的领域还少么,医疗涨价吧, 结婚登记涨价吧,离婚登记涨价吧,准生证涨价吧,殡葬服务涨价吧,读书涨价吧,因为价格一定要反应需求嘛,一涨价,中国的一堆问题就解决了,和谐社会可期矣.

2011/01/10

[让子弹飞]中的隐喻

张麻子:不合法的方式夺取权力者,隐喻啥就不多说了,你懂的:)
黄四郎:强大的既得利益者
汤师爷:政治游戏中的投机者,可以是任何人:知识分子,商人, you name。
鹅城百姓:人民。
这下姜文想说啥就一目了然:
1 和既得利益者斗也要枪杆子说话
2 要斗智斗勇
3 权力怎么骗来的没关系,因为人民大多数时候不会质疑你权力的合法性
4 一定时候给人民甜头他们就会跟你去打土豪抢豪绅
5 要善于利用投机者

姜文真TMD煞费苦心阿,不就是为帝王师嘛,至于包装成这样了,看片的时候老婆还纳闷这满口脏话还带限制级镜头的片怎么能通过天朝审查,现在就了然了。
无论胸毛再长多长,嗓子再多粗,枪飙得有多狠,姜文还是那个骨子里流着毛左血的姜文。