David Gordon论哈佛教授Michael Sandel的“Justice”讲座

很想把这篇文章翻译出来，但是想想太费时间，就算了，如果你看过思考过Sandel的讲座，相信这篇文章能启发你更多的思考。

另：附上“Justice”讲座网址



It is easy to see why Michael Sandel is a popular Harvard professor. He presents major ideas of ethics and political philosophy in a clear way, tied to important contemporary issues. Justice: What's the Right Thing to Do?, based on a famous course that Sandel teaches, offers a discussion of what Sandel regards as the three main competing views of justice.

The first of these takes welfare to be the criterion of justice. What counts as just is what leads to the best consequences. Thus, supporters of the free market such as Milton Friedman praise the market because it leads to prosperity, in contrast with other economic systems.

Why do we care [about prosperity]… The most obvious answer is that we think prosperity makes us better off than we would otherwise be — as individuals and as a society. Prosperity matters, in other words, because it contributes to our welfare. (p. 19)
Another approach, which many libertarians will find familiar, takes freedom and rights to be fundamental to justice. What is essential, according to this way of seeing things, is to give each person what is rightfully due to him, even if following this course does not lead to the best consequences.

The approach to justice that begins with freedom is a capacious school… Leading the laissez-faire camp are free-market libertarians who believe that justice consists in respecting and upholding the voluntary choices made by consenting adults. The fairness camp contains theorists of a more egalitarian bent. (p. 20)
The third view, the one to which Sandel is himself inclined, stresses virtue. What character traits should the government, as well as society as whole, endeavor to inculcate in the population?

The idea of legislating morality is anathema to many citizens of liberal societies, as it risks lapsing into intolerance and coercion. But the notion that a just society affirms certain virtues and conceptions of the good life has inspired political movements and arguments across the ideological spectrum. (p. 20)
This latter approach may be less familiar than the other two, but an example will show what Sandel has in mind. He considers sellers who increase prices in response to a disaster. Are not such people displaying greed, a character trait we do not wish people to have? Sandel knows full well the argument that raising prices in a disaster increases the supply of goods that people need. He quotes a characteristically incisive passage from Thomas Sowell on the point at issue.

Thomas Sowell, a free-market economist, called price gouging an "emotionally powerful but economically meaningless expression that most economists pay no attention to, because it seems too confused to bother with" … Higher prices for ice, bottled water, roof repairs, generators, and motel rooms have the advantage, Sowell argued, of limiting the use of such things by consumers and increasing incentives for suppliers in far-off places to provide the goods and services most needed in the hurricane's aftermath. (p. 4)
Nevertheless, he does not regard this consideration as decisive. Even if raising prices promotes welfare, still, "we" don't want to promote greed, do "we"? Sandel is evidently willing to sacrifice a great deal of welfare to obtain the sort of virtue he wants. As we shall later see, his virtue-oriented position has little to recommend it. I have here merely introduced it briefly.

Sandel does a good job in showing the weakness of the welfare view, although here he goes over standard ground. If we aim to achieve the best consequences, will we not sometimes be required to do morally abhorrent things? Some actions, e.g., torture, are wrong, regardless of consequences.

To this objection there is a familiar rejoinder. What about the terrorist and the ticking atomic bomb? Are we really sure that torture is in all circumstances wrong? Sandel has an excellent response. In the imagined case, the terrorist is guilty of a horrendous moral wrong, planting the nuclear bomb. We can sharpen the case by asking whether it would be wrong to torture someone completely innocent, in order to extract the essential information.

Suppose the only way to induce the terrorist suspect to talk is to torture his young daughter (who has no knowledge of her father's nefarious activities). Would it be morally permissible to do so? (p. 40)
The consequentialist would have to answer, implausibly, that it would not be wrong.

Readers of this journal will naturally be interested in what Sandel has to say about one rights-based approach in particular, libertarianism. One might reasonably fear the worst: Sandel stands among the foremost communitarians and, as his previous work makes evident, he views the free market with disdain.[2]

Sandel here proves unpredictable. He thinks that most of the standard objections to libertarianism fail; even if there is something to these objections, libertarians have plausible responses.

Those who favor the redistribution of income through taxation offer various objections to the libertarian logic. Most of these objections can be answered. (p. 66)
If an opponent claims that the free market leaves too much to luck, libertarians can respond that people are self-owners and have the right to make exchanges as they wish. Further, libertarians are by no means obviously wrong when they compare taxation to forced labor. Nor will it do to respond to this that taxation has been democratically enacted. If taxation is slavery, majority support does not change things.

If democratic consent justifies the taking of property, does it also justify the taking of liberty? May the majority deprive me of freedom of speech and of religion, claiming that, as a democratic citizen, I have already given my consent to whatever it decides? (p. 68)
Surprise has its limits. As readers will have already surmised from Sandel's comments about the market and greed, he has not converted to libertarianism. But if he thinks that the usual objections do not overthrow libertarianism, why does he not join us? He answers by moving to his own preference among the three approaches he distinguishes. The problem with libertarianism involves virtue.

"Sandel stands among the foremost communitarians and, as his previous work makes evident, he views the free market with disdain."
Libertarianism allows people to engage in degrading exchanges. A free market would permit people to sell their kidneys for frivolous reasons, e.g., to satisfy a healthy and wealthy eccentric who collects kidneys. Even worse, it would allow consensual cannibalism. Sandel describes a bizarre case in Germany in which this occurred.

[C]annibalism between consenting adults poses the ultimate test for the libertarian principle of self-ownership and the idea of justice that follows from it. It is an extreme form of assisted suicide…If the libertarian claim is right, banning consensual cannibalism is unjust, a violation of the right to liberty. (p. 74)
Further, libertarianism leads to such horrors as an all-volunteer army. People with proper civic spirit will want to defend their country out of patriotism, rather than for pay. If they are not thus motivated, nevertheless they have a civic responsibility to serve and the draft enforces this obligation. Sandel appears to have forgotten his earlier remarks about taxation and slavery — or is slavery all right as long as civic responsibility mandates it?

Sandel's complaints about degrading exchanges cannot be so readily dismissed as his misguided praise for conscription: nevertheless, the appropriate counter to them is apparent. Libertarianism does not claim to encompass the whole of morality. Quite the contrary, it asks only, when is force or the threat of force permissible? The answer to this question delimits a sphere of rights, but not everything that is within one's rights counts as morally acceptable. People are free to do bad things, in the sense that they cannot be compelled to do what is morally required. Only if they violate rights can force be used against them. The fact, if it is one, that the consensual cannibal does not violate rights leaves us free to recoil from him in disgust.

Sandel is well aware of this response, but he does not accept it. He subsumes it under a more general doctrine, neutrality. In this view, the state must remain neutral between competing moral views. (Of course, many libertarians think that the state should not exist, but we can readily substitute "the protection agencies" for "the state" in the argument.) Thus, even if most people find cannibalism morally abhorrent, the state cannot impose this opinion on those who dissent from it.

Sandel argues that neutrality cannot be sustained. Are there not certain issues that require the state to commit itself, one way or the other? The state cannot be neutral on abortion. Either fetal life merits protection, or it does not: the state cannot say that because people have conflicting moral views on the issue, it must stand aside.

For, if it's true that the developing fetus is morally equivalent to a child, then abortion is morally equivalent to infanticide. And few would maintain that government should let parents decide for themselves whether to kill their children. So the "pro-choice" position in the abortion debate is not really neutral on the underlying moral and theological question… (p. 251)
Sandel makes this point in criticism of a familiar target, John Rawls. Here Sandel has in mind Rawls's famous doctrine of public reason, which limits the considerations that may be invoked in public debate.

Sandel's complaint against neutrality fails. Even if he were correct — in my view he isn't — that the state must take a stand on some issues, it hardly follows that it must do so wherever a moral controversy arises. Abortion inevitably raises issues of rights; Sandel's horror stories of degrading exchanges in a libertarian society do not. He thus leaves intact the libertarian contention that people should be free to act as they wish, so long as they do not violate rights.

Anyone with the slightest libertarian inclinations will shudder at Sandel's own approach to justice. As he sees matters, we must determine the meaning of social institutions such as marriage. "What counts as the purpose of marriage partly depends on what qualities we think marriage should celebrate and affirm" (pp. 259–60). Of course it will be the courts that decide this; such weighty matters cannot be left to individual decision. In this way, e.g., disputes over gay marriage can be settled. Having settled such controversies, we can then be enlisted in programs of civic improvement.

A politics of the common good would take as one of its primary goals the reconstruction of the infrastructure of civic life … it would tax the affluent to rebuild public institutions and services so that rich and poor alike would want to take advantage of them. (p. 267)
We can thus transcend the market economy and the greed that motivates it. Onward and upward!

Notes
[2] See, e.g., his Public Philosophy: Essays on Morality in Politics (Harvard, 2005) and my review in The Mises Review Fall 2005.

Caplan论精英与自由意志主义

Caplan是{理性选民的神话}作者，乔治梅森大学教授。

There are times and places where most people want more individual freedom than they have. The majority of the citizens of the Soviet Union did not want the state to seize farmers' land, or send Orthodox priests to Siberia. The majority of the citizens of 18th-century France and Spain did not want to pay high taxes to build their kings more palaces and fund more foreign wars. And I bet that the majority of the citizens of modern China want the freedom to have any many kids as they want. In the right times and places, a libertarian can say "give the people what they want" with a good conscience. In the right times and places, a libertarian can be a populist.

In modern democracies, however, libertarian populism is not a viable option. Why? Because there is very strong evidence that the majority favors either as much or more government than exists. (For a summary, see here). All of the main categories of government spending - Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid, military - are popular. The only item the public consistently favors cutting is foreign aid - about 1% of the budget. Furthermore, the public heavily supports even the least defensible infringements on personal liberty - like prohibition of marijuana.

OK, libertarians: Suppose you could press a button that overruled one of the multitude of statist policies that a majority supports. Would you push?

If you won't push the button, you're not much of a libertarian. The libertarian who refuses to overrule popular statism is saying, "Individual freedom will have to wait until the majority thinks it's a good idea." That's more tedious than waiting for Godot.

If you are willing to push the button, however, people will call you an "elitist" for second-guessing the majority. And they'll be right. The libertarian who overrules popular statism is saying "At least on this issue, I know better than most people."

With my recent piece in Cato Unbound, several people have questioned whether my elitism is consistent with libertarianism. They've got it all wrong. In a modern democracy, not only can a libertarian be elitist; a libertarian has to be elitist. To be a libertarian in a modern democracy is to say that nearly 300 million Americans are wrong, and a handful of nay-sayers are right. So how can you be one of the nay-sayers, unless you think you and your fellow nay-sayers have exceptionally good judgment?

None of this means, of course, that libertarians ought to be rude or unfriendly. If we want to change the world in a libertarian direction, we have to convince people who don't already agree with us. And rhetorically speaking, "I'm right, you're wrong" falls flat. (I prefer "I'm right, the people outside this classroom are wrong, and you don't want to be like them, do you?") But in a modern democracy, libertarians cannot honestly praise the wisdom of the common man. He's the guy who got us where we are today.

ZT 性与经济学

网上看到的一篇文章，甚至都没有作者

性与经济学
　　
（一）

对我来说，性是一种珍贵的稀缺资源，当然，我指的是性生活，而不是性别，性别我自己也有一个，这是我快乐和烦恼的根源，用经济学的术语说，就是成本，这成本在有生之年能给我创造多大的价值和效益，或者赔个一毛不剩，变成呆坏帐和闲置资产，我心中还十分没底。

波茨纳说，性是人类理性的实现。这句话可以这么理解：如果我知道茱迪福斯特染上了艾滋病，那么不管我多么仰慕她，也不会跟她上床，这事风险太大。这说明做爱本身就是一种经济行为，有需求，有供应，有风险，有收益，还要计算投入产出比，芝加哥学派代表人物贝克尔断定：上帝目光所及，皆可交易，那么毫无疑问，深藏床帷之后的性爱和农贸市场上的萝卜具有某种共性，这也符合波普艺术家们的价值观，1954年艾伦金斯伯格接受记者采访，说世上并无尊卑，如果有不平等，那也只是价格上的不平等。我觉得既然谈到价格，那其实还是一种平等——钞票面前人人平等，比如香港的淫媒组织就曾经列过一张菜单，把演艺界的女明星一网打尽，我心中的那些偶像，从清纯玉女到三级肉弹，谁值多少钱标得清清楚楚，如果我手上有一亿美元，那感觉就象走进了超市。

不考虑宗教信仰和道德的负面影响，那么一次单纯的、形而上的性爱就是一个契约，酒店里的桑拿小姐问先生要不要服务，可以视为一个要约邀请，至于老婆掐着老公的脖子发令：官人，我要！就明显是一个标准合同，不明白标准合同的朋友们可以这么理解：虽然你反对手机双向收费，也不满意中国电信的服务，但你还是要入他们的网。

合同订立后的性爱象一单混合了FOB和CIF特征的国际贸易，FOB的意思是船上交货，货物在越过船舷之前，发生任何毁损灭失、遗弃泄露都不能算是交易成功，失败后的男人们一个个垂头丧气、额头冒汗，这充分说明做爱是一种高风险的活动，而“哪里有风险，哪里就有保险”，于是就有了杜蕾丝、拉士丁和杰士邦这些品牌，根据弗里德曼的“假设不相关论题”，我们可以断定杜蕾丝和中国人寿作的是同样的生意，而第一个把避孕套叫作“保险套”的人堪称伟大，他要不是天才，就一定是个经济学家。CIF术语指的是货主承担成本、保险费和运费，所以到药店里买避孕套的大多都是男性，交易过程中，出力最多、忙前忙后的大多也是男性，货主嘛，规定要承担运费的。

如果探究到细节，性爱合同比其它合同更加完备：除了交货、验收，它还有交易后的信息反馈机制，电影《一声叹息》里，张国立问刘蓓：好不好？刘蓓娇喘一声：好死了。看得人心潮激荡。当然，这种反馈机制并不能保证信息的完全对称，上海有个美女写了一篇文章，大标题就是：《伪装高潮也快乐》，这明显是在号召提供虚假信息，如果这种作法如果被会计师事务所学了去，必然会引发信用危机，严重打击投资者的信心。我在此要引用的第二个案例是美林证券，这家世界闻名的证券公司因为提供虚假投资评估，2002年被罚了一亿美元，那笔钱如果给我，我就有能力去逛逛超市了。

（二）

对体制内的交易双方来说，性象一块永远嚼在口里的口香糖，它的好处是随时都东西让你咬，不至于空虚，不至于闲得牙疼；缺点是越嚼越无味，到最后就成了一种纯粹的习惯。“七年之痒”的说法，不仅说明消费者对单一产品、无差别服务的厌倦，也证明了性资源使用中的边际效用递减：最开始拉拉手精神抖擞，亲一下浑身颤抖，但后来拉得越多、亲得越多，这事就越没有吸引力，美国一个无聊的民间调查机构统计了三百多对夫妻的睡姿，最后得出结论：婚龄半年以内的夫妻，大多是面对面搂抱着睡，婚龄超过2年的，几乎百分百是背对背睡。这些姿势和体位，我们可以看作是人性化的市场需求信息。还有一位专攻下三路的诗人说，他在婚姻中唯一获得的“体制性的阳痿”，看来他需要到消费者协会去投诉。

康德认为婚姻的意义就在于“合法使用对方的性器官”，薛兆丰说婚姻是“终生批发的期货合同”，这些都说明婚姻是一个规模经济，规模经济与单干户相比，优势主要在于两点：一是成本小，没结婚的两个人需要两张床，结了婚就只需要一张；二是可比价格低，香港报纸上有很多色情广告，广告卖点多是皮肤、身材，或者武功，从来没见过有小姐宣称自己价格低，“跳楼价、大出血、拆迁甩卖”什么的，因为她们知道自己在这方面没有优势——老婆是不用花钱的，所以只好在差别化服务上作文章。

性市场大概是唯一一个供应不足的买方市场，一方面，小姐们纷纷抱怨“生意越来越难做”，另一方面，体制内外的男人们都在进行着DIY，这情形有点象我们经历过的“以计划经济为主，市场经济为辅”。我表哥那时候曾因为“投机倒把”坐了几年牢，出来后赚了一点钱，据说养了好几个二奶，然后我表嫂就开始留指甲，时常偷袭他。这两种审判说明投机倒把始终是一种背德恶行，而走私更加不可饶恕。但根据我表哥的供述，他也确实值得原谅，我表嫂出身名门，教养过人，对做爱有近乎苛刻的要求：要洗澡，要关灯，要遵循法定程序，要正面交流，决不可暗度陈仓，等等。这大大提高了他们之间的交易成本，用经济学的术语讲，就是高关税壁垒，我表哥不懂经济学，他用最朴素的话表达他的意见：真他妈没意思。其实他讲的是一个利润问题。

张五常在中山大学演讲时，说交易成本越高，人就越穷，交易成本降低一点点，人民生活就会快乐很多。这话简直就是我说的。法国人心中的完美妻子是“客厅里的贵妇、卧室里的荡妇、起居室里的仆妇”，这其实也是在响应张先生的理论：降低交易成本。我表嫂因为她长期供应的质次价高的性产品，终于在1999年被我表哥取消了交易资格，他们离婚了。这对一直持币待购的投资者，我，是一个沉重打击，从那以后我见人就说我是一个独身主义者。

（三）

前些日子各地都有“换妻俱乐部”的报道，我这个人有点趣味低下，遇到这样的新闻，总要反来复去地看。《圣经》上说“亲近邻舍之妻的，不免受罚”，所以搞换妻俱乐部的这些家伙，最后全都被捉将官里去，打板子，捱班房，我是一个独身主义者，没资格参与这种非法活动，见了总不免有点幸灾乐祸。

换妻这事可以算是一种等价交换，稍具经济学常识的人都知道，交换是一种增值行为，农民拿粮换布，是因为他织布要比种粮食花更多的时间，这种交易让他节约了时间。由于没有人想作亏本买卖，所以换妻肯定也是一种增值行为，前面说过了，夫妻之间有个“性的边际效用递减”问题，“李杜诗篇万口传，至今已觉不新鲜，”而换妻则可以解决生产中的设备老化问题，以自己的不新鲜换别人的新鲜，使效用大大提高。萨缪尔森有个幸福公式：幸福=效用/欲望，在欲望不变的情况下，效用越高，就越幸福。所以换妻事实上是一件幸福的事，但这结论显然不符合上帝的旨意。

经济学中有个名词叫“帕累托优化”，是指在资源分配中，不损害他人福利而进一步改善自己的福利，1980年华罗庚数学竞赛有这样一道题目：大家排队取水，桶各有大小，怎样排列才能保证总体效率最高？答案很明显：小桶在前，大桶在后。但这损害了大桶者的利益，所以它是一个伪帕累托。阿瑟•奥肯1975年的“漏桶试验”，损害富人的利益来帮助穷人，是另一个著名的伪帕累托。照我看世间真正的帕累托优化不多，而换妻就是一个。它没有损害任何人的利益——大家自愿，换过后也不影响使用，但每个人得到的效用都大大提高，当然这里必须排除性病传染的因素。

几单位的性资源换一辆保时捷，可能大多数人都觉得不值，也付不起，香港某位著名女星还换了一套几千万的豪宅呢，你怎么说。不过这也正常，交换总会有价格问题，电影《不道德的交易中》，黛咪摩尔的老公拿她换了一百万美元，事后十分痛苦，觉得这生意不划算，如果他换来的不是一堆钱，而是别人的老婆，想来就会好过一些。

换妻应该算是男人的恶行，网上有些女网友评论，说这样的男人真恶心，拿老婆当玩物。这话看似偏激，实则非常接近真理——性其实就是种物权。物权的一个重要特征就是排他性，你买了一只锅，这只锅就只属于你自己，别人不能轻易碰。性也是这样，尽管老婆大多时候都闲着，但谁也不会让别人轻易使用，也许变态会这么干，但我从没见过。再说说网上评论的事，女网友评论完了，有个男网友在后面骂，骂得十分提神：三八，你们怎么不说那些当老婆的，她们不也在换夫吗？

当然，换妻这事最终是个道德问题。经济学要不要兼顾道德，经济学家们也一直在吵个不停。但道德这东西谁能说得清呢，除了上帝。宗教主义者认为上帝是人类最终的理性，这话可以跟波茨纳那句“性是人类理性的实现”联系起来理解。《圣经》里是这么说的：“艳丽是虚假的，美容是虚浮的，惟敬畏耶和华的妇女值得称赞。”这话有点费解，如果我有个老婆，让她怕耶和华我没意见，但非要她敬他爱他，我就觉得他是在占我便宜，单方面的我不干，要就换妻。


（四）

按古龙的说法，性产业是最古老的职业，“堪为百代祖师”，那时候没有钞票，人们拿贝壳换粮换米，我怀疑有些人收藏贝壳就是想回到原始社会。根据伪学者慕容雪村的考证，“性”这东西可以算是另一种贝壳，每一单位的性资源换多少张狍子皮，换几捧高梁米，大概早有定数。即使到了现代社会，性依然是万能结算工具，可以换彩电，换房子，换工作，换城镇户口，有个美女还拿它换了一个法官当。所以英国前首相狄斯赖利说“货币是唯一比爱情更让人发狂的东西”，这里的“货币”如果不是指性资源，我就觉得不大好理解。

站在动物的立场，人类的性压抑、性苦闷实在是不可理解，93年春天我去北京动物园玩，看见一只老虎四脚乱跳，咆哮不止，据说是发情使然。想想这些动物们也真可怜，一年只有那么一季，还不容易遇见合适的对象，茫茫林海，真爱何求啊。人类就不一样，一年到头都不闲着，自带设备搞生产，方便又轻松，资源又丰富，没有稀缺性。经济学中的“稀缺性”指的是对需求而言，资源总是有限的、不足的。这种理论应该不适用于性资源，人类的性需求十分有限，“百年三万日”，这数字大概可以算是人类的极限，即使威猛强悍如张伯伦，也有支撑不住的时候。与这有限的需求相比，人类拥有的性资源可以算是无穷无尽的，50亿人口中有一半都是异性，如果我们也是老虎，肯定用不着四脚乱跳，咆哮不止。

一个开放的性市场需要制定交易规则，这是套用康芒斯的话。为了避免性市场陷入萧条，政府应当以行政干预拉动需求，比如对性产业免税等等，这大概可以算是凯恩斯主义者的观点。不过在现阶段的中国，康芒斯和凯恩斯们都无用武之地，性产业不合法，从业者只好在地下状态左躲右闪，偶尔生产，这显然不符合规模经济的要求。就象爱伦坡的诗：被光明弃绝/向幽暗中寻找自我。这诗是我查字典翻译的，不知道译得对不对，但2000年我曾见过一个被收容的姑娘，她这样对警察说：找不到工作，摆个摊你们又要没收，不干这个干什么？那姑娘如果会用英文写诗，中国可能要多一位女文豪。

红灯区合法化的问题，在全世界都有争论，反对者认为性产业合法化会导致伦理危机，上帝是这么说的，“妓女如深坑…她埋伏好象强盗，她使人多有奸诈。”上帝的比喻总是很形象。除此之外上帝还说了一句：“与妓女结交的，浪费钱财，”事实上有钱不用才是恶行，因为那将导致经济危机，否则政府拼命拉动内需干什么。18世纪初，英国医生伯纳德•曼德维尔写过一首诗叫《蜜蜂的寓言》，说节约并非美德，奢侈浪费才是致富之道，这诗对凯恩斯有莫大影响，但明显跟上帝过不去，所以被禁了好几百年。反对者的第二个理由是性病，认为红灯区合法化就是性病泛滥的前兆，这话也有事实依据，比如泰国就有爱滋病泛滥的问题。

我个人倒是赞成合法化，但谁如果认为我这是为了自己嫖娼方便，我也无话可说。我的观点是这样的：既然不可能禁绝，不如拿它来赚钱。一个阵地，政府不去占领，黑社会就必然去占领。钱在政府手里和在黑社会手里哪个更能为广大人民造福，这事不好说，但逃税总不是美德。至于“伦理危机”，我看就是个幌子，陀斯妥耶夫斯基的小说《卡拉马佐夫兄弟》中，米蒂亚这样告诉阿辽沙：关于伦理学，我没法对你解释清楚。根据我的个人经验，所有解释不清楚的东西都会成为幌子，比如雷公电母、狐仙和柳树精，乡村巫医们靠着这些发了老鼻子财了，但最大的一个幌子就是所谓的伦理道德。再说说泰国的爱滋病，据我分析它不是红灯区合法化的问题，只是政府管理不当，如果不合法，可能传染得更厉害。众所周知，地下状态什么东西都传播得快，比如小道消息、黄段子，还有SARS。

上世纪九十年代，荷兰鹿特丹曾打击过色情行业，结果政府税收锐减了几亿盾。据说太原也有这种情况，但身边的事不好说，我们还是说别人吧。


（五）

作为一名独身主义者，我坚决认为婚姻是个赔本买卖。首先它的机会成本太高，我们形容某人得不偿失，常说他“捡了芝麻，丢了西瓜”，那么结婚就是捡了一粒芝麻，却丢了一个谷仓。投资理论讲“不能把所有的鸡蛋放在一个篮子里”，而结婚显然是违背了投资理论，你把所有的蛋都放了进去，最后却未必就能孵出小鸡鸡来，弄不好连蛋都要打破。前些日子广东有个案例：有个人在外面包了个二奶，老婆发现后怒不可遏，一刀将他的作案工具割下来扔进了马桶，连生产设备都报废了，可以算是鸡飞蛋打的典型。同例我们还可以参照美国歌星迈克尔∙杰克逊，他现在一年要付给前妻300万美元，有一次差点就破了产。

说起婚姻的实质，连我这个独身主义者都替你们难过。人类的性供应时间不长，20岁开张，60岁打烊，也就40年左右的时间，听说有人七十多岁还能搞批发，我觉得那肯定是部长以上级干部，全靠补药顶着，要不然就是su-su-super猛男。40年是14000天，按三天一次计，人一辈子能消费的性资源不过4600单位。如果不生孩子，也不谈爱情，那么结婚其实就是为了这4600次。“我能想到最浪漫的事，就是和你一起慢慢变老”，细细分析起来这事其实并不怎么浪漫，白首偕老，终生相伴，不过是4600次活塞运动的另一种说法。为了使问题更好理解，我们对结婚的成本进行实证分析：

一、结婚的直接成本。北京人结婚时，前来道贺的小伙子会这么唱：“结婚了吧，傻冒了吧，一个人挣钱两个人花……”可见结婚要付出50％的收入，即使离婚也要按这个标准来分割共同财产。根据莫迪利阿尼的生命周期假说，消费取决于人一生的收入，我们假设一个人月收入1000元，工作40年的总收入是48万。48万一半自己用，一半拿来跟老婆换那4600次，平均每次也就是52块多。在这个问题上富人比穷人吃亏更大一些，如果月收入一万，那么性交的单价就是500多，据说莫斯科四星级酒店里就是这个价格，所以富人容易包二奶，因为每多包一个，他的成本就会降低一倍，由此我们可以得出一个结论：决定夫妻关系并不是所谓的道德伦理，而是供需关系。如果你不巧是比尔∙盖茨，那就太惊人了，按上述计算方式，你跟老婆亲热一次的价格是1100万美元，这钱如果买成猪肉，可以买16,000,000斤。

二、结婚的简接成本。胡塞尔说真正的自由主义是不结婚的，这说明结婚要损失自由，裴多菲有诗道：为了自由，生命也可抛，爱情也可抛，可见自由是无价的，除了这无价的自由，你还必须在婚姻生活中花费大量的个人时间，比如陪老婆逛街，或者陪老公打麻将，这时间也是金钱；有人婚后感情不好，喜欢跟老婆吵架，说不定还要发生武斗，但不管是打坏了老婆，还是被老婆打坏，都要付出修理成本；如果被抓伤了脸，还要编谎话请假，产生误工成本；如果老婆一气之下回了娘家，你可能要磨破几双皮鞋，经济学中把这种成本叫作“皮鞋成本”。

这么说来，婚姻就是一个大竹杠。批发本来应该比零售便宜，我们都知道商业采购的原理是“批量越大，成本越低”，现在可好，你一下子全包了，结果还被人狠狠敲了一竹杠。

当然，婚姻还有其他的价值，比如社科院的一个博士就说婚姻是人类繁衍的工具。我不大赞同这种说法，据我所知，人类繁衍靠的是性器官，而不是靠结婚证书。否则你去领个结婚证，再回家把那什么割了，看看能不能生出孩子来。要是生得出来，我情愿输你一本《葵花宝典》。照我看，婚姻不仅不能保证繁衍，反而大大有害于人类繁衍，我们都知道杂交水稻好，不仅长得壮，产量也高，五八年的时候据说一亩地能打几十万斤。而结婚即使有一千种好处，也掩盖不了这个致命的缺点：在婚姻的稻田里，你永远没法培育杂交品种。

（六）

在自由放任的经济理论之前，经济学的一个重要任务是怎样增加生产，避免出现饥荒。我们都知道，饥荒是生活基本资料，尤其是粮食的供应不足引起的，三年困难时期，因为高估产、高征收，再加上大办人民公社的过度浪费，弄得老百姓连饭都吃不上，活活饿死了几千万人。

性爱市场也会产生供应不足的问题，对男性来说，女方不断提升的性技术、不断扩大的性需求真是个灾难。据说有个丈夫天天在汤里放安眠药，让老婆一吃完就呼呼大睡，不去想性供应和性需求的事，这法子可能有效，但实在是有点缺德：你万一把人家吃傻了怎么办？

供应不足如果严重了就会发生饥荒，有饥荒就会有逃荒者，这事就叫红杏出墙。平常人们对逃荒者总是很同情，除了安徽凤阳在1961打击过要饭的，说他们影响了社会主义的大好形象，捉进去吊起来打，此外还真没见过这么没人性的。但对性爱逃荒者，人们却一直都很鄙视，说她们淫荡、道德沦丧、不守妇道，它的代表人物就是潘金莲，人家不过就是在饥荒时吃了几口别人家的饭，就被道德学家们骂了一千多年，骂得人人自危，连慕容雪村这么大胆的人都有点哆嗦。这事其实是一个产权不清的问题，跟我们的国企改革差不多：潘金莲有没有权利按照她自己的意愿分配她的性资源？或者说，究竟谁是潘金莲性工厂的真正所有者？是她自己，还是武大郎？按照所有权与经营权分离的原则，武大郎最多只有经营权，但你们非要连所有权都夺去，我觉得这中间一定有什么猫匿，建议清河县反贪局介入调查。

我在企业里管过采购工作，一般情况下我都会选一家固定的供应商，定点采购的好处就是成本低、供应及时。但如果这家供应商供不上货，那我就要多找两家，这和潘金莲做的没什么区别，也没见谁说我淫荡或者道德沦丧。所以在这个问题上我有点同情潘金莲，她和我一样都是优秀的采购员，关注采购质量，寻求足量、及时的供应，但我又加薪又升职，过得滋滋润润，潘采购却被公安局长武松一刀砍了，其间的迹遇，真是令人不胜嘘嘘。

前面说过了，经济学有时要研究如何增加生产，在这个问题上，经济学家和管理学家们有很多理论，比如提高劳动生产率，延长作业时间，还有费亨氏理论、德罗定律什么的，金正日将军提出还要有艰苦奋斗的精神，但我认为最重要的还是科学技术，所以西门庆买了两个银托子，所以印度神油和龟鳖丸才会那么畅销，社会学家说性药泛滥是一个社会道德沦丧的标志，我觉得这事跟道德关系不大，我们卖春药只不过是为了避免饥荒，而众所周知，搞出饥荒可实在算不上什么道德高尚。

科技是第一生产力。但说也奇怪，性工业应用科技不是为了提高生产效率，反而是为了降低生产效率。说起“效率”这个词人人都明白，就是用最少的时间做一件事，比的是谁更快，而在性爱问题上，人们却总想用最多的时间做那件事，比的是谁更慢。

（七）

经济活动会产生外部效应。关于“外部效应”，可以这么理解：比如办教育，除了能赚钱，还能提高国民素质，这“提高国民素质”就是一种外部效应，它是好的，所以叫作正的外部效应；开化工厂要污染大气，这是坏的，就是负外部效应。工厂污染大气，这是政府要管的事，所以要对化工厂额外收税，这种税最早是英国经济学家庇古提出来的，就以他的名字命名，叫作庇古税。

我们的主旨是谈性。性产业的负外部效应十分明显，前段时间澳大利亚有家妓院上市，我到他们的网页上浏览了一下，发现满页都是黄色图片。我这个人虽然趣味低下，自制能力还是有的，所以看了也不会出什么事。换了是个没有自制能力的人，说不定就要跑到大街上骚扰妇女，这事我看就该算到妓院头上。

除了诱发犯罪，性产业更严重的外部效应是伦理问题。伦理是人间正道，不管佛教、基督教，还是伊斯兰教，都反对色情，如来讲不可邪淫，耶酥说不可亲近妓女，安拉更彻底，连妇女穿高鞋他都会不高兴。在这个问题上三位神仙站到了一起，旗帜鲜明地反对色情事业，不过照我看也没妨碍了它的兴旺发达。

性产业悖德，主要是因为它的非法性、经营场所的隐秘性，以及它兜售的廉价的快感。我们受过教育的人都知道，快感应当通过高尚的途径获得，比如阅读，观赏革命电影，或者扶老太太过马路什么的，要有集体主义的思想觉悟，独乐不如与众乐嘛。现在你悄悄地躲起来，只顾着自己快活，全然不想亚非拉的受苦人民，这事即使不算卑鄙，至少也有悖于公有制的经济制度。根据司各特•埃里金纳的理解，肉体的快感是人类独有的，肮脏也是人类独有的，与完美的上帝无关。所以我们可以得出一个结论：肉体的快感是肮脏的。由于性产业拿金钱换快感的经营方式，而金钱是亵渎灵魂的东西，这就不仅是肮脏了，简直可以说是罪恶。

我不是清教徒，没有代上帝宣旨的义务，所以上面这些话只是随便说说，当不得真。因为性产业的严重的负外部效应，各国政府都制订了措施，限制它的经营规模，另外还要额外征税，我们前面说过了，这税叫作庇古税。有的地方采取的是征收管理费的方式，这管理费也可以算是庇古税。我有个朋友特别没文化，有一次我跟他谈起这个税，他一本正经地回答说：这税好，这税好，卖屁股嘛，当然要收屁股税。仔细想想，这话可能比任何经济理论都接近真理。


（八）


“做爱”是个动宾词组。根据我的观察，男性和女性对这个词的理解不大一样，男性偏重于那个动词，女性偏重于后面的名词。由此引发的逻辑是：如果“做”是重要的，那么跟谁“做”就可以忽略；反过来，如果“爱”是重要的，那么显然只能跟固定的对象“做”。

这个问题涉及到我们对“性解放”的理解。一谈性解放，很多人都要皱眉，说那是资本主义社会腐朽堕落的象征，这明显是把“性解放”跟“性泛滥”混淆了。事实上性解放是一个挺不错的事，第一是消除性别歧视，第二是把人从宗教的禁锢中解脱出来，让性真正成为取悦身体的工具。这两件事哪件都不坏。有个保守主义学者反对这第二条，说性应该与婚姻有关，是人类自我繁衍的工具云云，我觉得这其实是在把人当骡子看。如果只为了生孩子才交配，那么人跟牲口有什么区别。另外现在也计划生育了，活好几十年，只准来那么一次，未免太不人道。所以说这人应当被送到维多利亚时期去，众所周知，那时候连鸡胸脯都不准说，叫作白肉。丘吉尔就犯过这个错误，被一位夫人斥责，后来他给这位夫人送了一朵兰花，说如果你将它别在你的“白肉”上，将是我莫大的荣耀。

再说说“做爱”这个词，如果光“做”不“爱”，那么它有一个大概的价格。这个我们前面讲过了，从几十元到几分之一辆保时捷，不同类型的的产品有不同的价格策略。“爱”字就要复杂一些，有人说它是无价的，有人说它其实也很便宜，根据贝克尔的观点，万物皆可交易，即然什么都可以交易，那么就没有无价的东西。但究竟爱情值多少钱，一句话两句话也说不清楚，我们还是要进行实证分析。

在实际调查中，我拿这个问题问过6个人：假设你很爱你老公，给你多少钱，你会背叛他一次？这背叛当然是指身体上的背叛。从100万开始，所有人都点头；到50万，有一个人表示不行，这说明她爱她老公大于爱50万，但小于爱100万，我们取中间值：75万；到20万，又一个人表示不行，那么她的爱情大约值35万；再往下问，在10万元价位上有两个人退出，我们算作是两个15万；等到了5万元，最后的两个也无法接受，根据上述计算方法，是两个7万5。

这六位女性的爱情总值是155万，平均价格是26万不到。她们都是白领，月收入在3000到8000元之间，我们也取中间值：5500，那么26万相当于47个月的收入。稍具经济学常识的人都明白，上面提到的价格不是纯粹的零售价，而是一种机会成本，也就是说，为了获得这26万，她们必须抛弃些别的什么，要承担风险，如果被老公发现了，不仅要失去老公的爱情，还要失去老公能给她的那一部分钱，如果这钱大于26万，那么此人的爱情很可能就是个负值。用经济学的术语讲，叫作负价格；用商业术语讲，叫作无偿赠送；用我们的俗话说，这就叫倒贴。一钱不值。

我是在深圳进行上述调查的，深圳物价指数之高，是谁都知道的事实。如果换在别的城市，这价格很可能还要打折。我们甚至可以根据全国的物价水平，列出一张爱情价格表，沿海富庶地区的爱情贵一些，内陆穷一点的省份就便宜一些。所以内地的漂亮姑娘都爱找沿海的男人，用经济学的术语讲，这就叫作要素禀赋。

这种统计肯定不够严谨，但可以说明一个基本事实：爱情是有价的。另外，爱情肯定与一个人的收入水平有关，收入越低，爱情就越便宜，只有亿万富婆的爱情才可能价值连城。这里也有一个问题，我们都知道，爱情是两个人的事，是个双务合同，光剃头挑子一头热还不行。即使一个人的爱情价值连城，如果她老公拿着不当一回事，那买卖还是做不成。这道理就象两口子卖车，女的说给我多少钱都不卖，男的说一块钱您就拿走，你说这车它值多少钱？

这种结果很难让人接受。在我们的观点里，爱情是无比美好的东西，它甚至是我们俗世生活的信仰，怎么可以象萝卜白菜一样，摆在柜台上任人挑拣？怎么可以用钱来衡量，有钱人拿贵的，而我们穷人，就只配拥有那些一钱不值的烂货？它应当超越金钱啊。

这里有一个关键问题：身体的偶尔出格是否就等于背叛爱情？如果不是，那么我们上面的分析就不能成立，那个26万就不是爱情的价格，而是婚外性行为的价格。如果坚持认为两者是一回事，那么毫无疑问，你的爱情即使超越了26万，也没什么了不起的，谁还没见过钱啊。另外还有一个问题：如果身体的放纵算是背叛爱情，那么思想上的放纵是不是就更严重？我在四川的时候学会了一个词，叫打望，打望就是在街头观看美女的意思，我承认我在打望时有过非份之想，按照我们上面的分析，这就叫作亵渎爱情。打望这事不大好管，除非你每次上街都戴个眼罩。话说回来，如果连打望的权利都取消了，那还真不如直接给我一刀。


翁倩玉唱道：爱是love，爱是amour，爱是人类最美丽的语言，爱是正大无私的奉献。要我看，如果正大的爱情真是那么美，那一定跟性无关，不会因为偶尔的放纵就收回去。否则那就不是无私奉献，而是倒贴。

ZT-Darwinian Liberalism

by Larry Arnhart

Libertarians need Charles Darwin. They need him because a Darwinian science of human evolution supports classical liberalism.

In his review of Darwin’s Origin of Species in 1860, Thomas Huxley declared, “every philosophical thinker hails it as a veritable Whitworth gun in the armory of liberalism.” The Whitworth gun was a new kind of breech-loading cannon — a powerful weapon, then, for liberalism.

In 1860, liberalism meant classical liberalism — the moral and political tradition of individual liberty understood as the right of individuals to be free from coercion so long as they respected the equal liberty of others. According to the liberals, the primary aim of government was to secure individual rights from force and fraud, which included enforcing laws of contract and private property. They thought the moral and intellectual character of human beings was properly formed not by governmental coercion, but in the natural and voluntary associations of civil society.

Although Darwin in his scientific writing was not as explicit as Herbert Spencer in affirming the evolutionary argument for liberalism, those like Huxley saw that Darwin’s science supported liberalism. Darwin himself was a fervent supporter of the Liberal Party and its liberal policies. He was honored when William Gladstone (the “Grand Old Man” of the Liberal Party) visited him at his home in Down in 1877.

Like other liberals, Darwin admired and practiced the virtues of self-help, as promoted in Samuel Smiles’ popular book Self-Help, with its stories of self-made men. Darwin was active in the charitable activities of his parish. He was the treasurer of the local Friendly Society. In Great Britain, friendly societies were self-governing associations of manual laborers who shared their resources and pledged to help one another in time of hardship. In this way, individuals could secure their social welfare and acquire good character through voluntary mutual aid without the need for governmental coercion.

Darwin was also active in the international campaign against slavery, one of the leading liberal causes of his day. In their recent book Darwin’s Sacred Cause, Adrian Desmond and James Moore have shown that Darwin’s hatred of slavery was one motivation for his writing The Descent of Man, in which he affirmed the universality of humanity as belonging to one species, against the pro-slavery racial science of those who argued that some human beings belonged to a separate species of natural slaves.

Also in The Descent of Man, Darwin showed that the moral order of human life arose through a natural moral sense as shaped by organic and cultural evolution. He thus provided a scientific basis for the moral liberalism of David Hume, Adam Smith, and the other Scottish philosophers, who argued that the moral and intellectual virtues could arise through the spontaneous orders of human nature and human culture.

Darwin and the Libertarians

One might expect that today’s libertarians — who continue the tradition of classical liberalism — would want to embrace Darwin and evolutionary science as sustaining their position.

But libertarians are ambivalent about Darwin and Darwinism. That ambivalence is evident, for example, in The Encyclopedia of Libertarianism, edited by Ronald Hamowy, under the sponsorship of the Cato Institute. There is no entry in the encyclopedia for Charles Darwin. But there are entries for Herbert Spencer, Social Darwinism, and Evolutionary Psychology. In these and other entries, one can see intimations that libertarianism could be rooted in a Darwinian science of human nature. But one can also see suggestions that Darwin’s science has little or no application to libertarian thought.

The entry on Evolutionary Psychology is written by Leda Cosmides and John Tooby, the founders of the research tradition that goes by the name of “evolutionary psychology.”
They indicate that evolutionary psychology was begun by Darwin. They say that its aim is to map human nature as rooted in the evolved architecture of the human mind. They summarize some of this evolved human nature, including reasoning about social exchange and cheater detection that provides the cognitive foundations of trade and the moral sentiments that make moral order possible. They contrast this idea of a universal human nature with the idea of the human mind as a blank slate that is infinitely malleable by social learning. They say that the false idea of the blank slate explains the failure of those experiments in social engineering that denied human nature, as illustrated by the failed communist regimes. This all suggests that a Darwinian evolutionary psychology could support a libertarian view of human nature.

But Cosmides and Tooby also cast doubt on this conclusion. Although the implementation of public policy proposals needs to take human nature into account, they say, “the position most central to libertarianism — that human relationships should be based on the voluntary consent of the individuals involved — makes few if any assumptions about human nature.” They don’t explain what they mean by this. One interpretation is that they are making a fact-value distinction, and suggesting that while the calculation of means to ends is a factual judgment that might be open to scientific research, the moral assessment of ends — such as the value of individual liberty — is a normative judgment that is beyond scientific research.

Perhaps their thought is more clearly stated by Will Wilkinson in his essay on “Capitalism and Human Nature”

We cannot expect to draw any straightforward positive political lessons from evolutionary psychology. It can tell us something about the kind of society that will tend not to work, and why. But it cannot tell us which of the feasible forms of society we ought to aspire to. We cannot, it turns out, infer the naturalness of capitalism from the manifest failure of communism to accommodate human nature. Nor should we be tempted to infer that natural is better. Foraging half-naked for nuts and berries is natural, while the New York Stock Exchange and open-heart surgery would boggle our ancestors’ minds.

Wilkinson argues that while our evolved human nature constrains the possibilities of social order, the historical move to liberal capitalism — the transition from personal to impersonal exchange — was a “great cultural leap,” as Friedrich Hayek emphasized. Within the limits set by evolved human nature, the emergence of liberal capitalism depends on cultural evolution. “We have, through culture, enhanced those traits that facilitate trust and cooperation, channeled our coalitional and status-seeking instincts toward productive uses, and built upon our natural suspicion of power to preserve our freedom.”

This dependence of classical liberalism on cultural evolution is also stressed by George Smith in his encyclopedia entries on Social Darwinism and Herbert Spencer. Smith argues that Spencer’s view of evolution was Lamarckian, and therefore quite different from Darwin’s view. While Spencer’s Lamarckian conception of evolution through the inheritance of acquired characteristics has been discredited as biological theory, Smith observes, this is actually a better approach for understanding social history than is Darwin’s biological approach. Social evolution — including the evolution of liberal capitalism — really is Lamarckian in that the social practices successful for one generation can be passed on to the next generation through social learning as a system of cultural inheritance. Most importantly for Spencer, the move from regimes of status based on coercive exploitation to regimes of contract based on voluntary cooperation was a process of cultural rather than biological evolution. Smith suggests, therefore, that the liberal principle of equal liberty arose not from biological nature but from cultural history.

Furthermore, Smith argues, Spencer and other classical liberals understood that market competition differed radically from biological competition. Biological competition is a zero-sum game where the survival of one organism is at the expense of others competing for the same scarce resources. But market competition is a positive-sum game where all the participants can gain from voluntary exchanges with one another. In a liberal society of free markets based on voluntary exchanges, success depends on persuasion rather than coercion, because we must give to others what they want to get what we want. Smith concludes: “It is precisely in a free society that Social Darwinism does not apply.”

There’s a big problem with Smith’s analysis. If Social Darwinism means explaining all social order through biological evolution based on zero-sum competition, then Darwin was not a Social Darwinist.

Darwin saw that social animals are naturally inclined to cooperate with one another for mutual benefit. Human social and moral order arises as an extension of this natural tendency to social cooperation based on kinship, mutuality, and reciprocity. Modern Darwinian study of the evolution of cooperation shows that such cooperation is a positive-sum game.

Moreover, Darwin accepted Lamarckian thinking about what he called “the inherited effects of the long-continued use or disuse of parts.” And he saw that the moral and social progress of human beings came much more through cultural evolution by social learning than biological evolution by natural selection. Darwin’s reasoning has been confirmed by recent research on gene-culture co-evolution. As Eva Jablonka and Marion Lamb have shown, a broad understanding of evolution must encompass four systems of evolutionary inheritance — genetic, epigenetic, behavioral, and symbolic.

Darwin’s liberalism combines an Aristotelian ethics of social virtue and a Lockean politics of individual liberty. This is the sort of liberalism that has been recently defended by Douglas Rasmussen and Douglas Den Uyl in their books Liberty and Nature and Norms of Liberty and by Den Uyl in his book The Virtue of Prudence.

To anyone who knows about my advocacy of “Darwinian conservatism,” it must seem odd that I am now arguing for “Darwinian liberalism.” But the conservatism I have defended is a liberal conservatism that combines a libertarian concern for liberty and a traditionalist concern for virtue. This is similar to the “fusionist” conservatism of Frank Meyer, which is close to the Aristotelian liberalism of Rasmussen and Den Uyl.

To see how Darwinian science supports classical liberalism, we must see how the liberal principles of equal liberty have arisen from the complex interaction of natural desires, cultural traditions, and individual judgments.

Natural Desires

If the good is the desirable, then a Darwinian science can help us understand the human good by showing us how our natural desires are rooted in our evolved human nature. In Darwinian Natural Right and Darwinian Conservatism, I have argued that there are at least 20 natural desires that are universally expressed in all human societies because they have been shaped by genetic evolution as natural propensities of the human species. Human beings generally desire a complete life, parental care, sexual identity, sexual mating, familial bonding, friendship, social status, justice as reciprocity, political rule, courage in war, health, beauty, property, speech, practical habituation, practical reasoning, practical arts, aesthetic pleasure, religious understanding, and intellectual understanding.

In Darwin’s writings on human evolution — particularly, The Descent of Man and The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals — he accounts for these 20 desires as part of human biological nature. We now have anthropological evidence — surveyed by Donald Brown and others — that there are hundreds of human universals, which are clustered around these 20 desires. Psychologists who study human motivation across diverse cultures recognize these desires as manifesting the basic motives for human action.

Rasmussen and Den Uyl identify the natural ends of human action as corresponding to a list of generic goods that resembles my list of 20 natural desires. Their list of generic goods includes health, beauty, wealth, honor, friendship, justice, artistic pursuits, and intellectual pursuits.

My assertion that the good is the desirable will provoke a complaint from some philosophers that I am overlooking the distinction between facts and values or is and ought. They will insist that we cannot infer moral values from natural facts. From the fact that we naturally desire something, they say, we cannot infer that it is morally good for us to desire it.

But I say that there is no merely factual desire separated from prescriptive desire, which would create the fact/value dichotomy. Whatever we desire we do so because we judge that it is truly desirable for us. If we discover that we are mistaken — because what we desire is not truly desirable for us — then we are already motivated to correct our mistake. Much of Darwin’s discussion of moral deliberation is about how human beings judge their desires in the light of their past experiences and future expectations as they strive for the harmonious satisfaction of their desires over a whole life, and much of this moral and intellectual deliberation turns on the experience of regret when human beings realize that they have yielded to a momentary desire that conflicts with their more enduring desires.

Whenever a moral philosopher tells us that we ought to do something, we can always ask, “Why?” The only ultimate answer to that question is because it’s desirable for you — it will fulfill you or make you happy by contributing to your human flourishing.

But even if we know what is generally or generically good for human beings, this does not tell us what is good for particular individuals in particular circumstances. Although the 20 natural desires constitute the universal goods of human life, the best organization or ranking of those desires over a whole life varies according to individual temperaments and social situations. So, for example, a philosophic life in which the natural desire for intellectual understanding ranks higher than other desires is best for Socrates and those like him, but not for others.

Evolutionary biology allows us to generalize about natural desires as the universals of evolved human nature. And yet evolutionary biology also teaches us that every individual organism is unique. After all, the Darwinian theory of evolution requires individual variation. Even identical twins are not really identical. Evolutionary biology also teaches us that human evolutionary adaptations enable flexible responses to the variable circumstances of the physical and social environment, which is why the human brain has evolved to respond flexibly to the unique life history of each individual.

If there is no single way of life that is best for all individuals in all circumstances, then the problem for any human community is how to organize social life so that individuals can pursue their diverse conceptions of happiness without coming into conflict. And since human beings are naturally social animals, their individual pursuit of happiness requires communal engagement. Allowing human beings to live together as children, parents, spouses, friends, associates, and citizens without imposing one determinate conception of the best way of life on all individuals is what Rasmussen and Den Uyl identify as “liberalism’s problem.”

Liberalism’s solution to this problem is to distinguish between the political order of the state as protecting individual liberty and the moral order of society as shaping virtuous character. While a liberal political community does not enforce one determinate conception of the human good, it does enforce procedural norms of peaceful conduct that secure the freedom of individuals to form families, social groups, and cooperative enterprises that manifest their diverse conceptions of the human good.

Cultural Traditions

Natural desires constrain but do not determine cultural traditions. If I am right about my list of 20 natural desires, this constitutes a universal standard for what is generally good for human beings by nature, and we can judge cultural traditions by how well they conform to these natural desires. So, for example, we can judge the utopian socialist traditions to be a failure, because their attempts to abolish private property and private families have frustrated some of the strongest desires of evolved human nature. We can also judge that political traditions of limited government that channel and check political ambition are adapted for satisfying the natural desire of dominant individuals for political rule, while also satisfying the natural desire of subordinate individuals to be free from exploitation. But cultural traditions like socialism and limited government arise as spontaneous orders of human cultural evolution that are not precisely determined by genetic nature or by individual judgment.

Recognizing that natural desires constrain but do not determine cultural traditions, Darwinian liberalism avoids the mistaken assumption of biological determinism that biology is everything, culture nothing, while also avoiding the mistaken assumption of cultural relativism that culture is everything, biology nothing.

The interaction of human nature and human culture is manifest in the cultivation of moral and intellectual character through the spontaneous order of civil society. Classical liberals believe that while we need the coercive powers of the state to secure those individual rights of liberty that are the conditions for a free society, we need the natural and voluntary associations of civil society to secure the moral order of our social life. The associations within civil society — families, churches, clubs, schools, fraternal societies, business organizations, and so on — allow us to pursue our diverse conceptions of the good life in cooperation with others who share our moral understanding.

Darwin showed how this moral order of civil society arises from the natural and cultural history of the human species. The need of human offspring for prolonged and intensive parental care favors the moral emotions of familial bonding, and thus people tend to cooperate with their kin. The evolutionary advantages of mutual aid favor moral emotions sustaining mutual cooperation. And the benefits of reciprocal exchange favors moral emotions sustaining a sense of reciprocity, because one is more likely to be helped by others if one has helped others in the past and has the reputation for being helpful. “Ultimately,” Darwin concluded, “our moral sense or conscience becomes a highly complex sentiment — originating in the social instincts, largely guided by the approbation of our fellow-men, ruled by reason, self-interest, and in later times by deep religious feelings, and confirmed by instruction and habit.” Recent research in evolutionary psychology has confirmed and deepened this Darwinian understanding of moral order that arises in civil society through the spontaneous order of human action rather than the coercive order of governmental design.

Individual Judgments

Natural desires and cultural traditions constrain but do not determine individual judgments. Classical liberals recognize that the human good or flourishing is complex in conforming to the natural ends, the cultural circumstances, and the individual choices of human life. Our shared human nature gives us a universal range of natural desires that constitute the generic goods of life. Our diverse human cultures give us a multiplicity of moral traditions that shape our social life. But ultimately, individuals must choose a way of life that they judge as best conforming to their natural desires, social circumstances, and individual temperaments. For that reason, liberals believe that the fundamental human right is liberty of judgment or conscience.

Darwinian moral psychology explains the evolutionary history of the human capacity for individual moral judgment. Most recently, neuroscience has begun to uncover the emotional, social, and cognitive capacities of the brain that make moral judgment possible. For example, while Darwin explained the evolutionary importance of sympathy for human moral experience, contemporary neuroscientists have studied the “mirror neurons” in human beings and other primates that allow animals to imaginatively project themselves into the experiences of other individuals.

Created from Animals

I have argued that Darwinian science is compatible with a classical liberal understanding of how moral order in a free society arises from natural desires, cultural traditions, and individual judgments. But does Darwinism make any unique contribution to liberal thought — something that could not have been derived from the moral and political thought of liberalism without the help of Darwinian science?

Yes, I think it does. Evolution provides a purely naturalistic grounding for liberal thought, so that there is no necessity to appeal to the supernatural. That’s important, because if liberal thought required supernatural beliefs, this might seem to require a coercive enforcement of those supernatural beliefs, which would subvert the individual liberty of conscience.

From Locke’s Two Treatises of Government to Jefferson’s Declaration of Independence to Spencer’s Social Statics, liberal thought has justified equal liberty as an expression of the unique dignity that human beings have as created in God’s image. For Locke, our natural desires give rise to natural rights because they have been implanted in us by God, and we are all naturally equal in our rights to life, liberty, and property, because we are all “the Workmanship of one Omnipotent and infinitely wise Maker.” For Jefferson, looking to the “Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God,” we can hold it to be self-evident “that all men are created equal” and that “they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights.” For Spencer, since God wills human happiness, He also wills that human beings should have equal liberty as the condition for satisfying their desires.

If liberalism requires such religious beliefs, then the liberal doctrine of religious toleration cannot include tolerating atheists. This was Locke’s conclusion, because he warned that denying the existence of God as the Creator of human beings and of the moral law dissolved the moral bonds of human society.

Darwin offered an alternative. In one of his early notebooks, he wrote that “man in his arrogance thinks himself a great work, worthy of the interposition of a deity, more humble, and I believe true, to consider him created from animals.” Although scientists and philosophers had long speculated on the possibility of a purely natural evolution of life, Darwin was one of the first thinkers to lay out a rigorous theory of how this could have happened, which included an evolutionary theory of the natural moral sense.

In his review of The Origin of Species, Huxley explained that Darwin’s book was a great weapon for liberalism because it refuted the Biblical doctrine of “special creation.” To protect liberty of thought from coercive theocratic authority, liberals needed to explain all of nature, including human nature, as the product of purely natural causes.

And yet, despite the claims of some of its religious opponents, Darwinism does not dictate atheism. Although Darwin by the end of his life was an agnostic, he recognized that religious beliefs were often important for the cultural evolution of morality. Recently, evolutionary theorists such as David Sloan Wilson have shown how the evolution of religion through group selection can strengthen the cooperative moral dispositions of religious believers.

But even without religion, Darwin suggested, believing that we were “created from animals,” we can see that moral order stands on purely human grounds—human nature, human tradition, and human judgment.

That’s why libertarians need Charles Darwin.

ZT 罗克维尔：好政府神话

卢埃林·罗克维尔(Llewellyn H. Rockwell, Jr.)，美国的自由意志主义经济学家和政治评论员，路德维希·冯·米塞斯协会的创办人和会长。

　　古典自由主义者的一个最严重、最无可救药的错误就是相信“好政府”——一个做“该做的事”的政府——的存在。
　　中国政府将在两年内赌博式地将5860亿美元投入“基础设施建设”。原因正如凯恩斯主义者所言：这笔开销是刺激投资所必需的。在人类历史上，这个大骗局就从来没有见效过。正相反，这是一个共产党掠夺私营经济的庞大计划，其目的是维护其统治权力。
　　对于中央计划的失败之处，没有哪个国家会比中国理解得更深刻。集体主义的每一种形式都已经在这个国家可怜的人民中试验过了。而这个即将在凯恩斯的名义下实行的新计划，其实与凯恩斯比与马克思还不相干。最后的结果，一样是扩大权力、缩减自由。
　　中国从共产主义中的复苏，是世界经济发展史中最激动人心的故事之一。这个国家在区区15年内，就从一个充满痛苦和匮乏的灾难之地成为了一个现代化国家。随着私营部门的不断成长，国家势力在一些领域不断收缩。这不是计划的结果，而是政府对自由经济动力的容忍的事实结果。
　　其中的关键是，中国作为一个文明社会的复兴，并非得益于中央计划，而恰恰是得益于其缺失。也就是说，政府的不干预带来了繁荣。
　　但是政府从未走远，只是它的掠夺变得更加复杂和难以预知。即便私营部门不断成长，中国的能源和钢铁等大工业也依然掌握在政府的手中，银行系统当然也不例外。
　　政府从来没有变好(而且也不可能变好)。如果说它变好了，那只是因为它做的事情比以前少了。而且，所有的政府都在悄悄等待危机。中国西南部的地震给国家干预提供了完美的借口。不过除了战争，没有什么比经济危机更能给国家提供扩张势力的借口。而美国对其自身经济低迷的令人厌恶的回应正好给世界提供了一个可怕的模式。中国共产党现在正好可以引美国为例，作为掠夺私营部门、扩张自身权力的借口。
　　可以肯定，中国的巨额支出不能促进经济增长。这无异于从私营部门中榨取5860亿美元用于攫取政治权力。别忘了，没有任何一个政府花的是自己的钱。这些钱一定是来自于赋税、通货膨胀，或者债务扩张。并且政府的支出选择相对于社会对财富运用的选择来说，通常都是不经济的。
　　这样的支出难道不能刺激投资吗？这可能会创造出当地的小景气，但都是暂时性的。从这个意义上讲，中国政府的支出将会带来投资者和消费者的回应性支出，这是对稀缺资源利用不经济的又一佐证。而如果将这些钱用来支持那些失败的企业，则尤其糟糕，因为这是一种试图践踏市场规律的行为，就像试图让被扔向空中的物体摆脱重力一样。
　　政府的本质——以及它们存在的基本原理——就是远离并高于社会，并纠正市场和个体的错误。优越的假定存在于政府的本质中，不论是小政府还是极权政府都一样。仔细想想，谁来决定何时干预、如何干预呢？如果政府天生就更贤明并且更优于社会，那么它也就可以自行决定什么时候进行干预了。
　　没有一个政府的本质是自由的。这是那些鼓吹“有限政府”的人从未学会的一课。你给予政府权力做任何事，它都会诉诸其自身控制的警察系统，并滥用权力。在中国是这样，在美国也一样。

来源：LEWROCKWELL博客 2008年11月15日 编译：段醒予

暴力城邦───一个突发事件摄影记者眼中的城市(ZT)

如果你不习惯面对任何血腥和暴力，就不用点了。
点这个链接吧

Caution: Photography can increase anxiety & stress

 

亻奄 学 会 了 扌斥 字 （ZT）

不 矢口 亻十 么 日寸 候 ， 亻奄 口斤 言兑 言仑 土云 有 辶寸 氵虑 敏 感 字 节白勺 言兑 ** ， 于是 ， 亻奄 学 会 了 扌斥 字 ， 后 来 ， 亻奄 米青 礻申 分 歹刂 了。



崔卫平

绿坝调教(ZT)

转自和菜头[槽边往事]


70后喜欢写帖子，80后喜欢画漫画。面对同样的滤霸威胁，80后发出了自己这一世代的声音。

根据他们的习惯，首先把滤霸具象化，于是，人们的面前就出现了一个全新的动漫人物：绿坝娘：



随后，就有了她的定妆照：



于是也有了动作：




取得了公共的认同，大家已经确定了这个人物的几大要素：


双马尾
风纪章
兔子
钥匙
河蟹帽子
酱油壶

并且出现了规范化的标准，例如帽徽：


标准像：


也有了自己的：《绿坝娘之歌》
更多精彩图片访问百度：绿坝娘吧

Big Brother is WATCHING YOU (ZT)

Big Brother, originally uploaded by NoEvilPeople.

2009年

中国政府宣布境内销售的所有计算机，必须预装绿色上网过滤软件，以便过滤互联网上的不良文字和图像。

2010年

中国政府宣布网站备案制度与“绿色上网”相结合。境内所有没有备案的网站，都会被过滤软件过滤。

2011年

中国政府宣布“网站备案制度”扩展到境外网站。凡是在中国境内可以访问到的境外网站，视同在华开展业务的外国机构进行管理，适用相关的外国机构管理法规。境外网站如果想在华开展业务，必须向中国政府进行备案，得到批准后才能开展业务。

2012年

中国政府宣布启动域名备案，境内所有域名都必须向政府备案。

2013年

中国政府宣布启用域名白名单制度，即只有在“白名单”中的域名，才提供解析服务。境内和境外网站在华一旦备案成功，其域名将自动加入“白名单”。

2014年

中国政府宣布对所有互联网上使用的加密证书进行备案。不管是公钥还是私钥，都必须在政府报备。如果加密通信中，使用了没有报备的密钥，电信公司的网关将自动拦截，阻止其通过。

2015年

中国政府宣布实行电子邮件实名制。凡是需要开通电子邮件的公民和企业，一律凭相应证件到政府指定的电子邮件服务商处申请。如果一封电子邮件的发信域，不在有合格资质的电子邮件服务提供商的列表之中，该封邮件将被自动退回。

2016年

2016年，中国政府宣布实行IP地址实名制。那个时候，IPv6已经得到广泛应用，IP地址不再是稀缺资源。根据中国政府的设想，每个公民一出生，就可以分配到一个IP地址，终生保持不变。然后，每个人上网，都必须使用自己的法定地址，不得擅自使用他人的地址。

2017年

2017年，中国政府向全世界宣告，“金盾工程”初步完成，中国已经建成了世界上最安全的互联网

关于GFW

或许应该改成interneet Asshole


注: TOR乃突破GFW最成功软件之一

the Great Firewall of China, originally uploaded by ༺lifemage༻.

又一个新字诞生了, originally uploaded by IsaacMao.

三座高墙, originally uploaded by IsaacMao.

GFW IS A GOOD THING [ A FANTACY WORK ], originally uploaded by Nths.

介绍一个新物种----Grass Mud Horse草泥马

Grass Mud Horse草泥马, originally uploaded by I’m 雅琳`` ｡◕‿◕｡ 海洋之星★...

　　在荒茫而美丽的马勒戈壁上。

　　生活着一群顽强的草泥马。

　　（因为草泥马实是主要物种，所以马勒戈壁又叫草泥马戈壁）

　　草泥马们克服了戈壁的艰苦环境，并顽强的生活下来。

　　戈壁上缺少水缺少食物，草泥马能进食的只有一种草

　　――卧草。

　　然而卧草一般生长在人类的聚集点附近。

　　所以草泥马一生都是于人类相依为伴的。

　　在一个草泥马群居点。笔者认识了朝泥族青年―朝泥两次。

　　他告诉笔者部族里只有成年男性才可以配有一匹草泥马。

　　草泥马分为三个品质。

　　最下等才叫做草泥马。

　　中等的叫做卧槽泥马。

　　而最上等的是狂槽泥马。

　　狂槽泥马是马王，要部族里骑术最好的人才能获得。

　　朝泥两次说自己因为骑术好。还没成年的时候就获得了狂槽泥马。

　　说完他立刻露出的腼腆的笑容。

　　随即笔者来到了朝泥两次的家。

　　他的母亲热情接待了我们。喝了些许马奶，就到了睡着了。

　　醒来后发现朝泥两次的父亲朝泥大爷也回到了家。

　　我便跟朝泥大爷聊了起来。

　　朝泥大爷显现出了忧伤的表情："日子不好过了，我们家以前是买马匹的。

　　现在改行割皮包了。因为草泥马吃的食物卧草几乎全被一种叫鹤蟹的动物吃掉了。

　　他说他也不知道鹤蟹是怎么来的。

　　但是随着食物的减少。草泥马数量也在急剧减少。"说罢流下了痛心的眼泪。

　　鲜红的晚霞和岩石如同一对轻骑。护送笔者离开马勒戈壁，在缓缓的落日下看着一群一群的草泥马湮没在沙尘之中。或许如果不保护环境。最后倒下的必将是人类……

顺便插一句，草泥马这个字是这样写的：

崔卫平:人有尊严与爱，又邪恶

崔卫平:人有尊严与爱，又邪恶

作者：崔卫平

（关于008年两部反思德国纳粹的影片）

2008 年出品的两部有关纳粹德国的影片《朗读者》与《浪潮》，体现了战后德国两代人对于纳粹灾难的反思，非常值得一看。在《朗读者》中扮演女主角的演员凯特·温斯莱特，因这部影片中的出色表演，刚刚获得奥斯卡最佳女主角奖。这部思想性非常强的影片，能够问鼎商业主导的奥斯卡，实属非常不容易，这从另一个方面说明了它确实很棒。导演斯蒂芬·戴得利2002年执导过那部有关弗吉尼亚·伍尔夫的影片《时时刻刻》。

《朗读者》（又译《生死朗读》）改编自小说，小说作者为德国人本哈德·施林克，战争结束的1945年出生，本行是大学法律教授。这一代人没有眼见纳粹暴行，但是他们是在纳粹留下的废墟中长大的，甚至可以说是在前纳粹人员当中长大的，他们的父母无一例外地卷入了那场灾难，虽然角色有别或程度不同。他们就是在这些人的呵护下长大，继承了他们的那份羞耻与罪责。

这份道德负担甚至比当事人本身还要强烈。不难理解，直接卷入和参与这场灾难的人们，他们所陷入道德上的混乱晦涩，并不会因为这场恶梦结束而终止，他们需要解释自己的行为，也需要为自己辩解，某种阴影始终会停留在他们内部。而没有做下任何事情的战后一代，在与过去的历史划清界限时，当然更有理由和更加理直气壮。这就是学者徐贲曾经提到的——在反思这段历史时，年轻一代德国人更加严厉。

到了风起云涌的 1966年，声讨的浪潮达到了某个顶峰。小说与电影中均对此都有所描写。小说是以第一人称写成的，已是法学院学生的主人，在面对审判纳粹残余时，表现了那样一种亢奋；“我们责无旁贷”。他甚至认为即使纳粹时期被贬黜的父亲，因为没有在1945年之后主动站出来检举那些作恶者，也“犯了知情不报的罪”。影片中的另一位法学院学生，则富有挑衅性地说出：“问题是你们怎么让这一切发生？在知道这些事情的时刻，你们怎么不自杀？”

某种情况有些像我们这里文化大革命时的革命小将，面对这样那样“历史污垢”的父母，表现出一种大义灭亲的无情立场。从父母那里继承来的耻辱，也许更加令人耻辱。愤慨激烈的情绪，既体现了某种道德立场，也体现了与上一辈做切割的决心，我们叫做“划清界限”。当然，1966年的德国青年面临的情况，与红卫兵并不完全相同，前者明摆是面对错误历史。然而，一种彻底决裂的方式，一种“目中无人、妄自尊大”的方式，便是面对历史最为恰当形式吗？一种居高临下、道德优越感的立场，便是恢复重建战后精神道德废墟的一部分吗？

将这个语境顺出来，再来看这个故事，就变得容易一些。它是战后第一代反省他们自己的故事，是与他们同代人之间对话，也是与这个民族曾经的一段精神历程进行对话。凯特·温斯莱特扮演的女主人公汉娜曾经是集中营看守，而且是一名纳粹党党员。战后她在公交车上当一名售票员，35岁时与年幼小男孩发生恋情，对方当时才15岁。这个故事因而拥有一个如同《洛丽塔》的外表，只是性别颠倒了一下。他们在一起除了做爱，重要的内容是朗读，年轻男孩不停地为年长女性大声读书，从《奥德赛》一直到契珂夫。这之后1966年汉娜作为纳粹残余坐在被告席上时，年轻小伙子体验着从未有过的复杂感情，他的天地发生旋转。据说这个故事在德国也引起了类似我们这里《色戒》那样的争议。

“请看清那些被告，你们找不出一个，会相信他们当年真的有权杀人。”法学院的教授说。与汉娜一起坐在被告席上的，是一些上了岁数的妇女和男人，他们看起来与常人无异。旁听席上有一位妇女正在织毛线，而这项活儿，应该也是坐在被告席上的女性们同样擅长的。她们是在看起来日常生活的氛围和规则当中，做了杀人帮凶。

汉娜与她的“同事”们看守波兰克拉科夫附近的一个小集中营，每个月她们都需要挑选一些人送往奥斯威辛，六个人每人挑选十个，加起来一共六十，这个“算法”日常如流水，仿佛合情合理。而汉娜有些不同的是，她将挑选出来的某个年轻、体弱、纤细的姑娘，先“保护”一段时间，给她吃好休息好，并在晚上秘密度过一段时间。开始时人们不免狐疑，后来得知，这位姑娘同样是在为她朗读书本。当然她最终不会逃脱魔掌，汉娜还是将她与别人一道送往无人生还的地方。汉娜并不觉得这样做有什么为难之处。若干年后她还这样回答审判长的质问：“如果是您的话，该怎么办呢？”

最为恐怖的还是这件：汉娜等一行五人负责转移几百名“囚犯”，晚间歇在一个村庄，“囚犯”们住进了教堂。夜袭的飞机投下了炸弹，教堂成了一片大火，看守们手握着教堂大门的钥匙，但是没有人想到要将门打开，放囚犯们生还，结果绝大多数人被活生生烧死，生还者寥寥无几。为什么不开门，汉娜是这样解释的：“我们是看守，工作是押送犯人，不能让她们逃跑。若是打开门，会出现混乱，怎样才能恢复秩序，我们得负责。”这样的解释并不构成年轻的法学院学生同情或倾向汉娜的理由。他的理由在别的地方。

审判到最后出现了令人意想不到的结果：当法官要求汉娜核对一份重要报告的笔迹时，汉娜没有在纸上写下任何东西，而是痛痛快快地答应了这份报告是她本人写的，全然不顾这样做会给她带来严重后果。此时，旁听席上的法学院学生突然意识到，这个汉娜原来是一个文盲，她不会读写，这才是她多年听人朗读的真正原因。小伙子意欲帮助汉娜澄清真相，说出她是文盲这个有利事实，但他没有这样做，他突然止步不前。最终，汉娜被判终生监禁，而其余同伙只有区区几年的刑期。

年轻学生没有说出真相，没有运用真相而改变审判结果，这个安排非常有意思。他尊重这位女性的意思，是她自己想要保守这个秘密。这是非常重要的。这个绝望的、颜面丢尽的女性，她不想继续当众丢脸，她希望能够保护自己的那点秘密，维持一个稍稍体面的外表，部分挽回属于她自己的尊严。尽管这给她带来更深的灾难和艰难局面，但是没有人可以说，因为是这样一个女性，她的这个要求便是不合理的。她的秘密应当得到尊重。认定对方是敌人，接下来便可以任意羞辱，那是另外一种做法。

这个起点还蕴涵了其他一些能量，或者至少与这些东西相平行，互相提供支持。第一，说到底，在教堂烧死几百人这件事情，虽然已经过去许多年，但是必须有人对此负责，这是肯定的。电影中提到德国哲学家雅斯贝尔斯的《德国罪过问题》，相关的知识分子讨论中，有人提出“行政责任”，也就是说，即便当事人强调当时的做法是服从命令或者当时国家的法律，属于行政范围，也并不能改变做这些事情本身的犯罪性质，以及身在其中所要承担的罪责。那份致命的报告虽然不是汉娜写的，但是在整个事情当中汉娜仍然有着不可推卸的重大罪责，她不是无辜的，必须为自己的所作所为承担后果。

第二，原来急于与上一代人划清界限的法学院学生，在保守这位女性秘密的同时，他与这个女性之间建立起了某个秘密通道，如同一个“攻守同盟”。这个“攻守同盟”并不是增添和隐藏罪恶（它恰恰通往承担责任），而是通过这个小小平台，年轻一代分担了上一代人的罪责、耻辱和历史负担，将这份特殊的遗产继承下来。不难设想，如果年轻人说出真相，那么他们之间便不再有任何联系，即使汉娜几年后出狱，他们也很难重叙旧情。而他帮助汉娜保守了这件秘密，他便与汉娜之间不可斩断，不管以何种方式。他后来多年如一日往监狱邮寄朗读磁带，保持与汉娜精神上的密切联系，包括对汉娜不识字这件事情负起责任。在历史负担面前，他不认为自己可以当甩手大爷。这样的立场，比起他的同学质问别人“你们为什么不自杀”所包含的咄咄逼人和道德优越感，要沉静、深刻得多。小说作者在接受访谈时说： “是爱将米夏卷入了汉娜的罪责之中；是爱，孩子对他们的父母、亲人、老师和神父的爱，将战后一代卷入了上一代人的罪责之中”。所谓“卷入”，是继续承担的意思，是觉得自己也有某种责任，而不是轻易地指责他人。这一点最为重要。

第三，汉娜的这份尊严感，一个罪人身上的这份要求，是否可以看作这个民族在滔滔恶名之下，试图重新找回自己的尊严与体面？试图建立和恢复自己的那份不可侵犯的感觉以及荣誉感？正是这个东西，才成了战后德国人重建自身和家园的动力？汉娜珍视和维护自己的形象，年轻人帮她一道努力，也就是说，年轻人在参与承担汉娜的罪责、继承历史负担的同时，也在试图保护那上一代人身上需要保护的那些东西？这些东西将战前与战后的德国联系了起来，将它们视为一个整体？对于这些问题的回答，包含了一种扑朔迷离的气氛，不管是肯定的还是否定的，都面临一些危险，但是故事显然触及了它们。这或许是这个故事引起争议的原因，也是这个故事在前人基础之上往前迈出的一小步。不能说是辩护——汉娜必须服刑，而是将问题在更加复杂的层面上展开，得到更加复杂深邃的表述。

在其他一些方面，这个故事直接继承了战后德国思想文化界对于纳粹现象反思的结果，比如汉娜·阿伦特的“平庸无奇的恶”。那些犯下滔天罪行的人，并不是一望即知的恶魔，而毋宁说是一些看起来平庸无奇的人，当他们卷进了那个杀人机器，就像一枚螺丝钉在其中兢兢业业，严格服从上级下达的每一项指令，不管它多么违反几千年以来人类赖以生存的基本常识，比如不杀人。在上级命令和 “规则”面前，他们表现得越平庸，越无所作为，其工作成越大、越光滑，破坏性也越大，从而他们自己身上的人性，也被没有人性的制度所吸收和取消，最终他们变得与这个制度一样丧失了人性。

人们身处邪恶而不知，阿伦特推荐的方案是“思考”，思考带有一种陌生的气味，意味着对于手头工作的一种 “中断”，一种回望自己的开始。思考将自身一分为二，从而也得以与环境保持距离。通过思考获得道德生活，这是在极端情况下人们自救的第一步。从这个角度看来，影片中那个著名细节——汉娜原来是一个文盲，她请别人为自己朗读是因为自己不认字，除了剧情的意义之外，同时还有某种形而上的象征意义：在现代社会里，一个不会读写的人，以及由此而产生的自卑，非常有可能被别人的那些花言巧语牵着走，她无从思考，思考的基本前提（阅读）她不具备，她同时也是一个道德文盲。

将这样一些罪责、伦理、政治、历史负担等问题，放进一个看起来是爱情故事的框架之中，能够揉合得那么好，那么自然，不能不佩服作者的功力，从中也可以见出诸如此类的深刻话题，并不是有人认为的是电影或者小说所不能承担的。相反，在处理这些话题上的每一步小小进展，才恰恰体现了艺术家的想象力创造力。顺便地说，中国的创作者包括电影人在这方面则显得不够自觉，在相关问题上知识界的讨论进展到什么程度，如何运用这些进展作为精神背景，做出自己的从容应对，几乎看不到什么动静。我手上的这个中文译本《朗读者》，前面有一位著名大学教授的“序言”，如果不是为了“立此存照”，我会随手将它撕掉。那样一种自娱自乐的小感觉，实在不配放在这本书的前面。

2008年3月份在德国上映的《浪潮》（又译《恶魔教室》），导演丹尼斯·甘塞尔（Dennis Gansel）是一位34岁的年轻人，2004年拍过一部影片《英雄教育》，关于1942年一所纳粹军官预备学校的故事，获巴伐利亚电影节最佳导演奖和德国电影节最佳剧本奖，人们惊讶时下沉湎于享乐与电子游戏的年轻人怎么会持续关注上个世纪的纳粹现象。当年在接受记者采访时，他便以一种毫不犹豫的口吻说道：历史会在当下重复。当人们遭受贫穷、不幸或者其他原因，便需要一个看上去能够使他解脱的团体。几年之后他用影片进一步回作出回答。

正如影片开头所表明的，这个故事来自真人真事。1967年4月，在美国加利福尼亚州的一所高中里，教师罗恩·琼斯为了让学生们理解法西斯主义，大胆地进行了一场试验，在五天的时间之内向他的班级灌输整齐划一的集体主义和纪律性，最后导致的却是不可收拾的混乱结果。1981年这桩事情被写成小说《浪潮》，继而美国广播公司又制作了电视系列短片《浪潮》。由来自德国的年轻导演再次激活这个话题，则更加具有意义。电影剧本也由导演本人撰写，细节极为饱满、富有层次和有说服力，为极权政权如何诞生这种看似复杂的理论问题，提供了一部形象版的简易教科书，纪录片的拍摄风格也使得影片虎虎有生气。2008年美国圣丹斯电影节（独立电影节）上放映年轻导演的这部影片时，当年实验的发明人罗恩·琼斯出席了首映式。这样一部影片，也居然在德国获得了年度票房冠军。

这门叫做 “独裁政府”的选修课与另一门课“无政府主义”一样，原意都是为了培育年轻人的民主观念。课堂上的高中学生对于“第三帝国”这类话题听得厌烦了：“又来了”。“这种事情反正不会再发生了。”“又不是我们做的，我们为什么要没完没了地背负着罪感？” 实际上学生们所厌倦的不仅是这类话题，而是还有更多。酒吧里两个男孩这样的对话，多么像发生在上海或者北京的同样一幕：“我们这一代人想要反叛却找不到方向，因为所有价值观都不存在了。我们所缺少的，是一个能够团结在一起的目标。”因此在年轻人party上喝过量的酒、作出猥亵的动作、有人吸大麻，寻求不同刺激，这也并不奇怪。

对于赖纳老师的针对性措施，我们就不应该感到陌生了，而是熟悉得不得了，因此，开头看这部影片是带着微笑的。第一步，将原来分散的圆桌式的课桌，集中为全部面朝黑板，取消任何其他的“课堂中心”；第二步，确立老师的最高权威，发言之前先举手，得到老师同意之后起立发言，原先直呼其名“赖纳”要改为“文格尔先生”；第三步，“一起跟我做双腿运动”：“左、右、左、右、左、右”，教室里立刻发出雷人的咚咚声响。这种做法还有一个顺便的作用，就是向别人示威，文格尔先生进一步启发道：“维兰德先生的无政府主义课就在下面，我想让我们的敌人吃吃天花板上落下来的灰尘。”在体验与他人的界限和区别中，教室里的脚步声更欢了。为了使得“我们班作为一个整体”而更加突出，重新安排的课桌根据这样的原则：一个“好同学”搭上一个“坏同学”。

不同意见之间的争执，开始于是否需要穿上统一的“制服”。白色衬衫与牛仔裤，这不难办到，赞同的女生还给出了充足的理由：原来每天上学，需要考虑今天穿什么衣服，现在统一服装，便不需要操心了。同为女同学的卡罗则不同意，她从镜子里看出白衬衫不适合自己，内心深处也反感这种统一着装：“制服排出了差异，也排除了个性。”一个外号叫做“软脚虾” 的男同学胆小懦弱，给别人弄来大麻却不敢收钱，在这项驱赶孤独的集体主义活动中（文格尔先生命名为“纪律铸造力量”“团结铸造力量”）他感到兴奋莫名，甚至将自己的其他衣服点上汽油，烧得精光。

穿上了统一服装的年轻人开始为自己的团体命名：“恐怖小分队”、“梦想俱乐部”、“觉醒者”、 “海啸”、“基石”、“核心”，人人都有一种自己正在干一件大事的感觉，最后决定取名“浪潮”，本片片名来源于此。统一服装、名称之后，接下来还要有统一的标志，男孩子们在夜晚将这标志贴编了大街小巷，有一条还出现在正在建设的高层市政府大楼建筑工地上，并上了当地报纸的头条。最后一项是统一问候手势，右手在胸前先俯下然后抬起，令穿上白衬衫的男孩女孩觉得很好玩，也很自豪。

学校有其他老师对于文格尔实验感到反感，包括他的妻子。但是，恰恰有家长来信支持，说自己的孩子这几天精神百倍，面貌焕然一新。学校的教务长对这样的来信表示满意。后来有一位同学写下的有关体验，令人想起了文革时期我们这里年轻人的同样的感受：“这几天的经历很有趣，谁最漂亮、谁成绩最好都不再重要，‘浪潮’我们人人平等。出身、信仰、家庭环境都不再重要，我们都是一场运动的一份子。‘浪潮’让我们的生活重新有了意义，给了我们一个可以为之奋斗的理想和目标。”

然而，事情并不能够以个人一时一地的主观感受作为判断尺度。需要问的是，这个理想和目标要将这些年轻人带往哪里？只有一点是明确的，那就是这种团体，需要不停地制造异己和敌人，不让组织之外的人加入他们的活动，哪怕是玩滑道这样的游戏。很可能，赖纳·文格尔先生一度也有些不能自持了。从未有过地被他人抬到这么一个权威高度，他多少有些顺水推舟，有些飘飘然，这才爆发了妻子与他之间一场争吵：“这段时间你变成一个混蛋。”“你通过崇拜而利用他们。”紧接着战场在班上一对男女同学之间展开。始终冷眼旁观、保持批判性的卡罗，被男友打得面部出血。男友开始反思卡罗所说的，这一切都失控了。

五天的实验结束，本来应该划上一个句号，但是成员们对于这样罢休感到不甘心。他们觉得需要开一个大会，讨论‘浪潮’的前途。当被称之为“叛徒”的学生被“五花大绑”地押送到主席台上，身为教师的赖纳开始发话，承认自己做得过火了：“谁让你们这么干的？如果我说杀了他，你们就杀了他吗？”“回到我们原先的讨论——这样的独裁专制在今天是否能够再现，而这不正是我们现在所做的吗？“我们以为高人一等，将所有反对我们都排除出去，……还不知道要做出什么来。”他继而宣布“浪潮结束”。没有想到的是，当年的“软脚虾”最不能接受解散“浪潮”的事实，在开枪打伤同学之后，他饮弹自尽。

在“恶魔教室“中呼唤出来的人性中的魔鬼，并不能够适时回到原处；没有人挑战的至高权力，最后变得不能控制自己所释放的局面。这场试验的其运作原则，其实简单得不能再简单：树立权威、整齐划一和排除异己。在网上看到年轻人将这部影片又称之为《纳粹速成》，这里没有见过纳粹的另一代人，但这并不表明他们彻底远离了这种病毒。

这部影片有力地说明，所有这些导致灾难的因素，导致极权政府产生的因素，并不在别的地方，人们用不着到别处去寻找它们的起源，而就是埋藏在人们自己的人性深处，与人们自己人性中的黑暗一一相对，在人们自身人性中拥有肥沃的土壤。当然，它们也需要某些现实的浇灌，比如感受无聊、失落、孤独、空虚，这一切很容易被这样那样的名目收编，经常是它们单等一声号令，马上倾巢而出。顺便需要指出的，并不是所有人与人的联合，都只能导致类似灾难。人们总是在求互相支持与联合，分而治之是专制统治惯用的手段。区别在于，是一个允许个性与差异、包容五光十色的共同体，还是只允许一种颜色、一个权威的那种团体。

假如纳粹的现象也有可能重来，那么，其他还有多少历史可以再度上演呢？我们对于自身人性的估计，需要多么悲观才能够与之相适应？想到这个问题，不免令人倒吸一口凉气。无论如何，感谢这部影片，在今天给人们提供了诸如此类的思考。
8:31 PM | Blog it | 关乎电影

大佑歌话5则(zt)

全文基本按观堂先生《人间词话》的行文风格和手稿顺序（与通行本次序不同）写就，仅供咱论坛内部参考。只愿冥界没有颐和园，不然老先生看了本文肯定又要再去跳湖了。

1．《你的样子》一篇，最得风人深致。赵传之“我终于失去了你，在拥挤的人群中”意颇近之。但一幽怨，一悲壮耳。

2．古今之成大事业、大学问者，必经过三种之境界：“聪明的你，告诉我什么是真理”此第一境也。“疯狂的你，告诉我什么是真理”此第二境也。“潇洒的你，告诉我什么是真理”此第三境也。此等语皆非大哲人不能道。然遽以此意解释《诞生》，恐为大佑所不许也。

2-1．今之恋人终成眷属者，必经过三种之过程：“你不属于我，我也不拥有你”此第一层也。“黑漆漆的孤枕边是你的温柔”此第二层也。“让这恋曲有这种说法”此第三层也。此等语皆非过来人不能道。然遽以此意解释《恋曲》系列，恐为大佑所不许也。

2-2．古之恋人终成眷属者，必经过三种之过程：“你不属于我，我也不拥有你”此第一层也。“让这恋曲有这种说法”此第二层也。“黑漆漆的孤枕边是你的温柔”此第三层也。此等语皆非过来人不能道。然遽以此意解释《恋曲》系列，恐为大佑所不许也。

3．《鹿港小镇》纯以气象胜。“梦中的姑娘依然长发迎空”寥寥十一字，遂关千古思恋之口。后世唯李宗盛之《鬼迷心窍》，周治平之《青梅竹马》，差足继武，然气象已不逮矣。

4．《恋曲80》：“你曾经对我说，你永远爱着我。”大有沧海桑田，美人迟暮之感。乃古今独赏其“爱情这东西我明白但永远是什么”故知解人正不易得。

5．尼采谓：“一切文学，余爱以血书者。”《台北红玫瑰》，真所谓以血书者也。郑智化之《堕落天使》亦略似之。然郑不过道生世之戚，大佑则俨有释迦基督担荷人类罪恶之意，其大小固不同矣。

转一首友人的诗，怀念在武汉的日子

《致远人》
采薇

繁华散尽太容易 孤雁过寒潭
春梦秋云 聚散依稀 恨醒别中原
记得当时秋池满
凭栏望断处 字里觅缠绵
昨日艳阳在 独照楚江边

浮云蔽日汉阳门 烟锁楚江岸
三生石上 旧痕依稀 尽望秋水边
记得当时潮无限
黄鹤楼高处 玉笛声声慢
梅花落不尽 夜夜对婵娟

入P家以后最rewarding的故事

无忌Pentax论坛上的一个贴子,有点BSO的味道,不过能感到是真情实感,
哎,都是玩Pentax的人,怎么就没这好事落我身上哩


http://forum.xitek.com/showthread.php?threadid=573011

聊一聊俺家乡

ZT自HL的blog

本文由 XL 发表在： 狮子座

>你是云南的？
> "YES"
> "哇..好远啊...."
> （沉默中..........）
> "云南解放没有？"
> "没有，我们上课的时候都带着枪"
> "你原来会说汉语~!"
> "恩，来的时候在火车上刚学的" .
>“你们住窑洞吗？”
>“不，我们住树上”
>“云南是不是在昆明？”
> "恩，云南是昆明的省会。"
> "你的很多小辫子呢?"
> "为了上大学只好剪掉了!"
> “你们还吃生肉吗？”
> “我们老大发明了燧木取火，我们吃烧烤……”
> 你们上学都骑大象吧
> 是啊，不过男的骑大象，女呢骑孔雀
> "你是云南人啊？"
> "是啊。"
> "那太好了，下次我去拉萨旅游，就住你家了啊。"
> "……没问题，不过我家离拉萨稍有点远。"
> "那你们怎么来上学?"
> "骑驴到北京后坐飞机。"
> "那一定很久才到吧?
> "习惯了,提前半年出发就行!"
> "………………！
> ”怎么不骑马呢？
> "在云南，骑马的都是穷人干的事情，像我们考出来的，都是骑骆驼和驴的。然后云南没有高考，考试都是比赛射箭，一公里以外摆个牌子，写上"清华"旁边放一个"北大"然后一个人有三次机会，我第一次射清华，第二射北大，都失败了，最后为了保险，射了最近的一块牌子，就是这个学校!

一张勾起童年回忆的片片

这张片片转自豆芽的相册
在俺长大的宣威，街上满是这种烤洋芋烤玉米的小摊，拌上酱，味道相当的棒，印象中上大学后再没有吃过这么香的洋芋，倒不是因为怀念童年的缘故，而是确实宣威的洋芋好吃。
另外我们的中学后面就有不少玉米地和洋芋地，经常进农民地里掰几个玉米棒子，刨几个土豆，带上火柴，用干了的玉米杆子在野地里就生火来烤，偶尔还和家里带的调料和火腿一起烤。干这种勾当的时候其实还是提心吊胆的，因为担心农民看到，有一次刨农民土豆的时候，就有个农民看到了，然后我就被他追得漫山遍野的跑，看来这馋根子那时候就落下了。不过我一般是不偷鸡的，有几个小伙伴还偷过鸡，有时被发现了，被告到家长那里去，免不得一顿好打。

原来,用Pentax拍美女这么危险......

ZT:瓦尔登湖畔的木屋和第三帝国的权杖

转自一朋友的blog

人们对金钱、权利和荣誉等如同对美食和美女一样，都有本能的欲望，只是这种欲望的程度和达到的方式不同。不同的人选择不同的生活方式，客观的讲，无所谓高尚与无耻，关键是你自己怎么想。卢梭可以在瓦尔登湖边上的小木屋里与大自然亲密接触，从中获得一种看上去让人羡慕的超然的淡泊；希特勒却也能从第三帝国的权杖中体会征服和占有的满足。抛开他们各自目的性质的问题，至少两者都是在坚持自己的选择。
问题是，这个世界通常是由不得你自己的。

偶补一句：
问题的问题是，在这个由不得你的世界你还应该坚持自己的选择么？