David Gordon论哈佛教授Michael Sandel的“Justice”讲座

很想把这篇文章翻译出来，但是想想太费时间，就算了，如果你看过思考过Sandel的讲座，相信这篇文章能启发你更多的思考。

另：附上“Justice”讲座网址



It is easy to see why Michael Sandel is a popular Harvard professor. He presents major ideas of ethics and political philosophy in a clear way, tied to important contemporary issues. Justice: What's the Right Thing to Do?, based on a famous course that Sandel teaches, offers a discussion of what Sandel regards as the three main competing views of justice.

The first of these takes welfare to be the criterion of justice. What counts as just is what leads to the best consequences. Thus, supporters of the free market such as Milton Friedman praise the market because it leads to prosperity, in contrast with other economic systems.

Why do we care [about prosperity]… The most obvious answer is that we think prosperity makes us better off than we would otherwise be — as individuals and as a society. Prosperity matters, in other words, because it contributes to our welfare. (p. 19)
Another approach, which many libertarians will find familiar, takes freedom and rights to be fundamental to justice. What is essential, according to this way of seeing things, is to give each person what is rightfully due to him, even if following this course does not lead to the best consequences.

The approach to justice that begins with freedom is a capacious school… Leading the laissez-faire camp are free-market libertarians who believe that justice consists in respecting and upholding the voluntary choices made by consenting adults. The fairness camp contains theorists of a more egalitarian bent. (p. 20)
The third view, the one to which Sandel is himself inclined, stresses virtue. What character traits should the government, as well as society as whole, endeavor to inculcate in the population?

The idea of legislating morality is anathema to many citizens of liberal societies, as it risks lapsing into intolerance and coercion. But the notion that a just society affirms certain virtues and conceptions of the good life has inspired political movements and arguments across the ideological spectrum. (p. 20)
This latter approach may be less familiar than the other two, but an example will show what Sandel has in mind. He considers sellers who increase prices in response to a disaster. Are not such people displaying greed, a character trait we do not wish people to have? Sandel knows full well the argument that raising prices in a disaster increases the supply of goods that people need. He quotes a characteristically incisive passage from Thomas Sowell on the point at issue.

Thomas Sowell, a free-market economist, called price gouging an "emotionally powerful but economically meaningless expression that most economists pay no attention to, because it seems too confused to bother with" … Higher prices for ice, bottled water, roof repairs, generators, and motel rooms have the advantage, Sowell argued, of limiting the use of such things by consumers and increasing incentives for suppliers in far-off places to provide the goods and services most needed in the hurricane's aftermath. (p. 4)
Nevertheless, he does not regard this consideration as decisive. Even if raising prices promotes welfare, still, "we" don't want to promote greed, do "we"? Sandel is evidently willing to sacrifice a great deal of welfare to obtain the sort of virtue he wants. As we shall later see, his virtue-oriented position has little to recommend it. I have here merely introduced it briefly.

Sandel does a good job in showing the weakness of the welfare view, although here he goes over standard ground. If we aim to achieve the best consequences, will we not sometimes be required to do morally abhorrent things? Some actions, e.g., torture, are wrong, regardless of consequences.

To this objection there is a familiar rejoinder. What about the terrorist and the ticking atomic bomb? Are we really sure that torture is in all circumstances wrong? Sandel has an excellent response. In the imagined case, the terrorist is guilty of a horrendous moral wrong, planting the nuclear bomb. We can sharpen the case by asking whether it would be wrong to torture someone completely innocent, in order to extract the essential information.

Suppose the only way to induce the terrorist suspect to talk is to torture his young daughter (who has no knowledge of her father's nefarious activities). Would it be morally permissible to do so? (p. 40)
The consequentialist would have to answer, implausibly, that it would not be wrong.

Readers of this journal will naturally be interested in what Sandel has to say about one rights-based approach in particular, libertarianism. One might reasonably fear the worst: Sandel stands among the foremost communitarians and, as his previous work makes evident, he views the free market with disdain.[2]

Sandel here proves unpredictable. He thinks that most of the standard objections to libertarianism fail; even if there is something to these objections, libertarians have plausible responses.

Those who favor the redistribution of income through taxation offer various objections to the libertarian logic. Most of these objections can be answered. (p. 66)
If an opponent claims that the free market leaves too much to luck, libertarians can respond that people are self-owners and have the right to make exchanges as they wish. Further, libertarians are by no means obviously wrong when they compare taxation to forced labor. Nor will it do to respond to this that taxation has been democratically enacted. If taxation is slavery, majority support does not change things.

If democratic consent justifies the taking of property, does it also justify the taking of liberty? May the majority deprive me of freedom of speech and of religion, claiming that, as a democratic citizen, I have already given my consent to whatever it decides? (p. 68)
Surprise has its limits. As readers will have already surmised from Sandel's comments about the market and greed, he has not converted to libertarianism. But if he thinks that the usual objections do not overthrow libertarianism, why does he not join us? He answers by moving to his own preference among the three approaches he distinguishes. The problem with libertarianism involves virtue.

"Sandel stands among the foremost communitarians and, as his previous work makes evident, he views the free market with disdain."
Libertarianism allows people to engage in degrading exchanges. A free market would permit people to sell their kidneys for frivolous reasons, e.g., to satisfy a healthy and wealthy eccentric who collects kidneys. Even worse, it would allow consensual cannibalism. Sandel describes a bizarre case in Germany in which this occurred.

[C]annibalism between consenting adults poses the ultimate test for the libertarian principle of self-ownership and the idea of justice that follows from it. It is an extreme form of assisted suicide…If the libertarian claim is right, banning consensual cannibalism is unjust, a violation of the right to liberty. (p. 74)
Further, libertarianism leads to such horrors as an all-volunteer army. People with proper civic spirit will want to defend their country out of patriotism, rather than for pay. If they are not thus motivated, nevertheless they have a civic responsibility to serve and the draft enforces this obligation. Sandel appears to have forgotten his earlier remarks about taxation and slavery — or is slavery all right as long as civic responsibility mandates it?

Sandel's complaints about degrading exchanges cannot be so readily dismissed as his misguided praise for conscription: nevertheless, the appropriate counter to them is apparent. Libertarianism does not claim to encompass the whole of morality. Quite the contrary, it asks only, when is force or the threat of force permissible? The answer to this question delimits a sphere of rights, but not everything that is within one's rights counts as morally acceptable. People are free to do bad things, in the sense that they cannot be compelled to do what is morally required. Only if they violate rights can force be used against them. The fact, if it is one, that the consensual cannibal does not violate rights leaves us free to recoil from him in disgust.

Sandel is well aware of this response, but he does not accept it. He subsumes it under a more general doctrine, neutrality. In this view, the state must remain neutral between competing moral views. (Of course, many libertarians think that the state should not exist, but we can readily substitute "the protection agencies" for "the state" in the argument.) Thus, even if most people find cannibalism morally abhorrent, the state cannot impose this opinion on those who dissent from it.

Sandel argues that neutrality cannot be sustained. Are there not certain issues that require the state to commit itself, one way or the other? The state cannot be neutral on abortion. Either fetal life merits protection, or it does not: the state cannot say that because people have conflicting moral views on the issue, it must stand aside.

For, if it's true that the developing fetus is morally equivalent to a child, then abortion is morally equivalent to infanticide. And few would maintain that government should let parents decide for themselves whether to kill their children. So the "pro-choice" position in the abortion debate is not really neutral on the underlying moral and theological question… (p. 251)
Sandel makes this point in criticism of a familiar target, John Rawls. Here Sandel has in mind Rawls's famous doctrine of public reason, which limits the considerations that may be invoked in public debate.

Sandel's complaint against neutrality fails. Even if he were correct — in my view he isn't — that the state must take a stand on some issues, it hardly follows that it must do so wherever a moral controversy arises. Abortion inevitably raises issues of rights; Sandel's horror stories of degrading exchanges in a libertarian society do not. He thus leaves intact the libertarian contention that people should be free to act as they wish, so long as they do not violate rights.

Anyone with the slightest libertarian inclinations will shudder at Sandel's own approach to justice. As he sees matters, we must determine the meaning of social institutions such as marriage. "What counts as the purpose of marriage partly depends on what qualities we think marriage should celebrate and affirm" (pp. 259–60). Of course it will be the courts that decide this; such weighty matters cannot be left to individual decision. In this way, e.g., disputes over gay marriage can be settled. Having settled such controversies, we can then be enlisted in programs of civic improvement.

A politics of the common good would take as one of its primary goals the reconstruction of the infrastructure of civic life … it would tax the affluent to rebuild public institutions and services so that rich and poor alike would want to take advantage of them. (p. 267)
We can thus transcend the market economy and the greed that motivates it. Onward and upward!

Notes
[2] See, e.g., his Public Philosophy: Essays on Morality in Politics (Harvard, 2005) and my review in The Mises Review Fall 2005.

神秘主义，理性与灾难──电影{Mist}观后感

周末看了一部恐怖片{Mist}，其实故事很简单，一场神秘的大雾笼罩了大地，大雾来临之时，一个超市的人为了躲避这场大雾，不得不留守在超市等待救援，事情越来越糟，大雾中似乎有神秘的怪兽会残杀冲向大雾中的人类。面对未知的灾难，超市里面的人产生不同的反应并结成不同的团体来应付眼前这场灾难。写到这里，你可能觉得这是类似[哥斯拉]或是[狂蟒之灾]那样的又一部陈词滥调的好莱坞恐怖商业片。但是如果我告诉你片子的导演是曾经导演{肖申克的救赎}的Darabont，剧本本身和{肖申克的救赎}一样也改编自斯蒂芬金的同名小说，你还会这样认为么？

片子的美妙之处在于这个超市就是人类社会的浓缩，整个故事就像是一场社会学实验，一群由单个个体的人类在危机来临之时自愿结盟来应对灾难，这种结盟基于3种思想或者说理念。

有限理性：持这种理念的主要人物就是片子的主人公德拉顿，他基于理性和逻辑来理解眼前发生的一切，但是这种理性和逻辑也对现象世界开放，也就是当现象世界和理性推演不一致的时候，他的理性和逻辑是让位于现象世界的，并基于新的现象，用理性和逻辑做出新的反应。他最早看见怪物，他并没有放弃自己的怀疑精神，他通过多种方式求证，并用证据说服他人接受不符合预设理性和逻辑的新现象──怪物。并组织大家和怪物对抗，同样是基于理性和逻辑──怪物是有生命的，它们也会死。他的理性是一种开放性的理性，在没有危机的时候，这种理性实际上就是一种common sense，所以在片子开始，危机并不严重的时候，赞同他的理念并和他结盟的人占大多数。

无限理性：德拉顿的邻居诺顿是这种理念的代表人物。片中很巧妙的安排一开始德拉顿和诺顿相处还算融洽，诺顿甚至帮忙照看德拉顿的儿子。这暗示在一个没有危机的平静世界里，有限理性和无限理性者都有共同的common sense。他们的分歧出现在德拉顿发现了怪物，并告诉诺顿，诺顿完全不相信，甚至当德拉顿带他去看了怪物的残肢他还是不愿意相信。诺顿的理念建立在对预设的理性和逻辑无条件的相信，这种预设的理性和逻辑完全不对现象世界开放。因为怪物不符合他预设的理性和逻辑，所以他拒绝相信，某这程度上，这是理性的自负。很遗憾，导演并没费太多笔墨在诺顿身上，他的跟随者不多，不久他就不顾德拉顿的劝阻带着他们走向大雾送死了。

神秘主义：从片中一亮相就神叨叨的卡莫迪大家也许不会想到后来她能有这么大的能量，灾难没开始和灾难初期的时候她几乎没有任何跟随者，她嘴里喋喋不休的世界末日论和末日审判论让大家讨厌极了。这表明神秘主义在一个相对稳定的环境下与理性相比是没有多大市场的。更多的怪物来袭和更多的人被怪物所杀渐渐改变了一些人的看法，卡莫迪的跟随者越来越多，这些跟随者和德拉顿以及诺顿的跟随者不同，他们是一群放弃个体理性和思考的乌合之众。这些跟随者的初衷或许只是希望从神秘主义那里得到一种精神层面的安慰，可是放弃个体理性的结果注定了这个团体必然会演进成一个暴力的强制性团体，神秘主义和极权之间的桥梁正在于此──个体对理性和思考的放弃。Jessup是第一个牺牲品，在更多的还拥有理性的人会被杀害之前，一场神秘主义和理性的战争爆发了。有限理性者并不干涉别人的自由，但是面对神秘主义者向暴力的演进，他们不得不阻止，最终卡莫迪被射杀了，德拉顿带着仅存的几个“理性人”逃进了茫茫大雾……

很遗憾的是本片没有太多探讨诺顿所代表的无限理性在危机进一步加深的时候会怎么演进，在我看来，无限理性所代表的思想倾向和共产主义思想是一致的，如哈耶克所批判的那样，这是一种理性的自负，它的演进方向其实和神秘主义是一致的──团体的意志被少部分人或者某个人的意志所绑架，最终倒向极权。

为什么我不信仰宗教

在海外很多年，朋友里面很多都是基督教徒，也不止一次碰到他们试图对我传福音，最近有朋友在facebook上又劝我信教。

其实我是认真想过关于信仰的问题，我爸妈在美国的时候也觉得教会特别好，希望我能信神。我一直不能说服自己有2大原因。我的前一个理由和毛姆类似，作为英国人，毛姆生下来便是基督徒，而那个时代基督徒几乎是把天主教视为异教的。有一天，他忽然想到，他完全可能生在德国南方，成为一个天主教徒，那样他就要因为并非自己的过错而作为异教徒受惩罚了。这未免太荒谬。这样一想，他从此不信教了。我的想法也类似，基督教可能非常好，但是我没法接受某种关于这个世界确定性的解释，假使我入教了，但是在信仰层面上，我没法保证有一天我的思想不会对另外的解释开放。


另外一个理由是功利层面的，我看到的所有信神的人们，他们和我们不信的人们一样面对种种生命中的苦难，逆境和挣扎，我相信他们有神的带领会很不一样，但是认识神本身也需要付出努力和代价的，所以在我看来信神不是根治苦难的magic bullet，如果苦难逆境本身是认识神需要的代价，那么对于一个不信神的人反正也需要付出代价去面对苦难和逆境，在这点上何以信神有优势。


其实我常常觉得biologically的思考这个世界，我就很平和了，我和一个信神的人其实没什么不同，我们都活着，我们都皈依某种价值观，as far as这种价值观让我们心里comfortable，无论它是叫基督教还是别的什么东西。

最后的最后，我会归于一个最没劲的解释，也许genetically，我就不太接受宗教，这或许是遗传自我妈，她在美国去了半年的教会，回去又一直被我信教的姑妈反复传福音，直到现在她还不愿受洗：）老人家不懂自由主义，也不了解进化生物学，我不太确定她用什么和传福音的人们argue, 但是据此你就说她信仰缺失，随波逐流，迷惘彷徨，老人家是万万不会答应的，相反她是我碰到的最有坚定明确人生观世界观的人之一，whatever她坚信的是什么，我想这都让她的内心觉得comfortable，在我看来，一个教徒心中对神的坚守和我母亲对她自己信念的坚守没什么本质的不同。

从进化心理学的角度理解“反集体主义”

看了刘荻最近的博文“反对集体主义”，只能说部分赞同她的观点。因为在我看来，从进化心理学的角度来理解集体主义也许更靠谱。
纯粹的个体主义在哺乳动物中几乎是不存在的，因为需要交配来繁衍后代，即使最孤僻的动物也需要性交和性伴侣配合组成暂时或者永久的最小“集体”。从这个意义上来说，所有人类其实都是小集体主义者，现代人类的大脑实际上是进化并适应了丛林时代的“小集体意识脑”。而集体成员的数目应该不超过一个典型的丛林时代部落的数目，在我看来，这比刘荻所说的所谓大脑皮质处理群体活动值150更make sense一些，刘荻没有说明这个数目的文章出处，我怀疑有任何现有神经科学能精确估计人类大脑所能handle的群体活动，而调查一个典型古人类部落的数目则是完全可行的。
人类文明演化出“阶级”“国家”这样的超级部落超过人类的集体意识所能handle的极限，本质上这可能是所有战争，种族灭绝，极权的根源。在现代社会，除非你一个人跑到深山老林，唯名论意义上的个人主义几乎是不可能。Physically, 几乎所有人都不间断的处于集体（公司，单位，学校）或个人（回到家）的状态。纯粹的反对一切形式的集体主义不仅是stupid的，也是不可能的。基于古典自由主义之上的或者安兰德式的自由市场资本主义理念所反对的集体主义也许是不恰当的。既然丛林时代大脑决定了人的本质是小集体主义，那么作为自由主义者，我们需要反对的集体主义其实是大集体主义，比如基于种族，阶级，肤色，收入，人种的集体主义。政治哲学意义上不可分割的单位是个体，但是进化心理学的角度来说，人类最comfortable的存在是小集体，只要这种小集体是基于自愿的联合，并不侵害其他小集体或者个体的利益，这样的小集体就应该被保障。而在现实生活中，也确实如此，在自由民主的社会中，人的存在不是以单个的分离的个体存在的，而是以这样那样的小集体存在的，这些小集体形式，可能是个公司，也可能是个兴趣小组，甚至是因为都得过某种病而自愿联合起来的病友会。


附刘荻文章：

一、集体主义是人类的本能

本文的主旨是反对集体主义，但笔者首先要澄清有关集体主义的一大误解，即认为集体主义是反人性的。

哲学家们通常假设人首先是独立的个人，然后通过契约（霍布斯、洛克、卢梭）或其他方式（诺齐克等）结成社会。这种假 设或许有其意义，但与真实的历史毫不相干。正如哈耶克所说：“霍布斯讲述的原始人的个人主义，纯属无稽之谈。野蛮人并不是孤立的个人，他的本能是集体主义 的，根本就不存在‘一切人反对一切人的战争’。”真实情况是，人类首先是生活在部落中的集体主义者，然后才逐渐发展出了个人主义。人类的本能是集体主义而 非个人主义，小团体中的利他主义、团结、合作和休戚与共都是人类的本性。人类确实会同类相残，但这通常只会发生在部落之间的战争中，很少会发生在一个部落 内部。“一切人反对一切人的战争”恐怕只有在《大逃杀》一类的文艺作品中才能看到。

二、为什么要反对集体主义

既然集体主义是人类的本能，那么我们为什么要反对集体主义呢？这主要是因为集体主义只适合部落大小的小团体，而不适合在更大的世界中采用。

有研究表明，灵长动物（包括我们人类）大脑新皮质的大小与动物所生活的群体的大小成正比。据计算，人类的大脑新皮质 所能处理的群体活动的最大值是150人，这恰恰是原始人类部落的平均大小。因此，一个群体的人数如果在150人之内，群体成员之间可以保持一种紧密团结的 关系，超出了这个数字，成员之间就会变得陌生，群体内部会产生宗派，这时群体就会分裂。这意味着，集体主义的休戚与共最多只能在150人左右的小团体中发 挥作用，超出这个范围，集体主义就失效了。此外，奥尔森等人关于集体行动的研究也表明，群体越大，其成员就越不可能在没有个人激励的情况下为共同的目标而 努力。虽然现代人也会把原本属于部落的集体主义情感投射到民族、国家之类的“大集体”上去，将其作为部落的替代品，但是这种用错了对象的集体主义情感不仅 不能给人类带来可靠的秩序，还可能会给人类带来灾难。

这是因为，人类的集体主义本能中还存在一些在现代文明看来是负面的因素。例如，集体主义总是与排外情绪裹胁在一起， 自己人之间的团结一致总是与对敌人同仇敌忾纠缠不清。这样，集体主义就会阻碍人类超越本能的限制，与“自己人”之外的人建立联系和创造超越部落范围的更大 的秩序和文明。另一方面，集体主义还会压制群体成员的异议，鼓励群体成员的极端化，从而造成“群体思维”、“群体极化”等现象，群体会变得越来越极端，并 且无视自己可能的缺点和错误，也无法集思广益。内部越团结、凝聚力越强、成员之间联系越紧密的团体越容易出现这种现象。集体主义的这两大缺点走向极端，就 会发生电影《浪潮》中所讲述的故事；而如果极端的集体主义感情被引导和转移到如民族、国家或阶级一类的“大集体”上，则会导致法西斯主义和共产主义之类的 极权主义，给人类带来灾难。

三、为什么要提倡个人主义

笔者之所以提倡个人主义，反对集体主义，并不是因为个人主义是人类的本性；笔者提倡个人主义，也不是提倡那种鲁滨逊式的与世隔绝的个人主义。相反，笔者提倡个人主义，是因为只有以个人主义为基础，才能建立起超越部落范围的更大的秩序和文明——即哈耶克所说的扩展秩序。

阅读某些描述非洲和印第安人部落的文字时，笔者的感想之一就是：文明的特征不是民主——原始部落往往也是相当平等和民主的，领导者不仅要尊重多数人的意见，也要考虑少数人的意见——而是个人主义和私有财产。

在没有个人主义和私有财产的情况下，部落只能依据共同的目标和共同的知识采取行动，其结果要么是少数人的意见遭到忽 视和压制，少数人的知识无法得到有效的利用，要么是部落为了照顾少数人，只有在所有人意见一致的情况下才能采取行动，因而无法有效地采取行动。（经济学研 究也证明，除非把企业产权落实到个人头上，使个人能够自由转让企业股份并从中获益，否则集体企业在市场竞争中是没有效率的。）

只有有了个人主义和私有财产，个人才能不顾集体的意见，进行自己的尝试和冒险。说到底，私有财产的目的就是为了划清 每个人之间的界限，保护每个人都有一个自己做主、自己负责的领域不受他人侵犯。只有有了这一私人领域，个人才能利用自己所拥有的财产和的分散的知识（哈耶 克语）进行尝试和冒险，并自己承担后果。说服别人的最好方式并不是语言，而是自己的成功。个人的尝试如果取得成功，就会被他人模仿，从而给整个社会带来好 处，这比在集体讨论会上努力用语言来说服他人采用自己的方法有效得多；而如果他的尝试失败，付出代价的也只有他自己。

只有个人主义和私有财产使得个人能够充分利用自己所拥有的分散的知识，与陌生人的交往和贸易才能大规模进行，与市场 有关的规则和秩序才能超越部落的范围不断扩展，更大规模的劳动分工才能实现，生产率才能不断提高，我们今天这种世界规模的文明和秩序才能成为可能。也就是 因为如此，波普尔才把每个人都面临个人选择的社会叫做开放社会，而把那种个人必须服从于集体的目标的社会叫做封闭社会或极权社会。

四、应该如何对待集体主义？

虽然集体主义有着以上种种缺点，但集体主义是我们本性的一部分，我们不可能、也不需要完全消灭集体主义。我们都需要 在家庭和小团体中获得温暖和归属感；由于在大社会中出人头地是如此不易，我们也需要在小团体或小圈子中享受一把受人尊敬的感觉；当然，我们也会利用集体主 义本能来成就某些事业，努力让集体主义本能与现代文明相适应，为现代文明做出贡献。但是我们也要时刻提醒自己：没有个人主义与私有财产，就没有我们今天的 文明世界。同时我们也要警惕集体主义的负面因素，如排外、种族主义等；还要警惕把集体主义本能引导和转移到民族、国家、阶级等“大集体”上去的政治企图。

Caplan论精英与自由意志主义

Caplan是{理性选民的神话}作者，乔治梅森大学教授。

There are times and places where most people want more individual freedom than they have. The majority of the citizens of the Soviet Union did not want the state to seize farmers' land, or send Orthodox priests to Siberia. The majority of the citizens of 18th-century France and Spain did not want to pay high taxes to build their kings more palaces and fund more foreign wars. And I bet that the majority of the citizens of modern China want the freedom to have any many kids as they want. In the right times and places, a libertarian can say "give the people what they want" with a good conscience. In the right times and places, a libertarian can be a populist.

In modern democracies, however, libertarian populism is not a viable option. Why? Because there is very strong evidence that the majority favors either as much or more government than exists. (For a summary, see here). All of the main categories of government spending - Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid, military - are popular. The only item the public consistently favors cutting is foreign aid - about 1% of the budget. Furthermore, the public heavily supports even the least defensible infringements on personal liberty - like prohibition of marijuana.

OK, libertarians: Suppose you could press a button that overruled one of the multitude of statist policies that a majority supports. Would you push?

If you won't push the button, you're not much of a libertarian. The libertarian who refuses to overrule popular statism is saying, "Individual freedom will have to wait until the majority thinks it's a good idea." That's more tedious than waiting for Godot.

If you are willing to push the button, however, people will call you an "elitist" for second-guessing the majority. And they'll be right. The libertarian who overrules popular statism is saying "At least on this issue, I know better than most people."

With my recent piece in Cato Unbound, several people have questioned whether my elitism is consistent with libertarianism. They've got it all wrong. In a modern democracy, not only can a libertarian be elitist; a libertarian has to be elitist. To be a libertarian in a modern democracy is to say that nearly 300 million Americans are wrong, and a handful of nay-sayers are right. So how can you be one of the nay-sayers, unless you think you and your fellow nay-sayers have exceptionally good judgment?

None of this means, of course, that libertarians ought to be rude or unfriendly. If we want to change the world in a libertarian direction, we have to convince people who don't already agree with us. And rhetorically speaking, "I'm right, you're wrong" falls flat. (I prefer "I'm right, the people outside this classroom are wrong, and you don't want to be like them, do you?") But in a modern democracy, libertarians cannot honestly praise the wisdom of the common man. He's the guy who got us where we are today.